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Network security is a paramount concern for organizations utilizing computer 
technology, and the Air Force is no exception.  Network software vulnerability patching 
is a critical determinant of network security.  The Air Force deploys these patches as 
Time Compliance Network Orders (TCNOs), which together with associated processes 
and enforced timelines ensure network compliance.  While the majority of the network 
assets affected by this process are Air Force owned and operated, a large number are 
maintained by external entities known as Program Management Offices (PMOs).  
Although these externally controlled systems provide a service to the Air Force and 
reside on its network, the TCNO processes for these assets are dictated and managed, to a 
large extent, by the PMOs.  There is no current or planned, standardized method to 
release TCNOs to PMOs within the AF.  Some are notified and tracked through a portal 
by the AFNOSC, while others are notified and tracked via secure email by MAJCOM 
NOSCs.  While AFI mandates that PMOs are responsible for establishing procedures to 
evaluate applicability to their systems, there are no quality checks, standardization 
requirements or oversight to ensure the results of such evaluations are sound.  
Nonetheless, these PMO systems directly impact the security of the Air Force Network 
and the Department of Defense at large. By examining existing PMO patch management 
processes, this study should provide a better understanding of the TCNO processes used 
by PMOs with the intent of exploiting strengths and addressing weaknesses in an effort to 
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I.  Introduction 
Network security is a paramount concern for organizations utilizing computer 
technology, and the Air Force is no exception.  In a ten year timeframe, the number of 
reported security vulnerabilities has risen from 100 in 1995 to almost 6000 in 2005 (see 
Chart 1) (CERT, 2006).  In addition, the director of CERT, Carnegie Mellon’s center of 
Internet security expertise, estimated as much as 80 percent of security incidents go 
unreported due to lack of knowledge or organizational reluctance to report (GAO, 2003, 
8).   It is clear that security incidents prove costly to all organizations worldwide.  In 
2004, a Congressional Research Service study estimated that major virus attacks alone 
cost $12.5 billion (Congressional Research Service, 2004).  This is just a portion of the 
estimated $470 billion to $580 billion of worldwide economic damage caused by digital 
attacks in 2005 (Wall, 2006).  In response to these costly threats organizations have 
implemented safeguards to intercept attacks and eliminate vulnerabilities.  U.S. 
companies alone are expected to spend $10 billion in 2006 on security compliance (Wall, 
2006).   
Network software vulnerability patching is one accepted method of mitigating 
these vulnerabilities and as such is a critical determinant of network security.  In fact, 
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according to CERT, “about 95 percent of all network intrusions could be avoided by 
keeping systems up to date with appropriate patches” (GAO, 2004, 6).  The process used 
to govern the implementation of these network vulnerability patches is commonly 
referred to as patch management (GAO, 2003, 11).   Although individual steps of the 
patch management process sometimes vary slightly among organizations, the overall 
process follows a common progression from acquisition to application of the patch.   
The Air Force deploys network security patches as Time Compliance Network 
Orders (TCNOs), which together with associated processes and enforced timelines ensure 
network compliance.  While the majority of the network assets affected by this process 
are Air Force owned and operated, a large number are maintained by external entities 
known as Program Management Offices (PMOs).  According to Air Force Instruction 22-
138, a PMO develops, acquires, and fields technical solutions for Air Force-networks 
and systems and exist at the Air Force and MAJCOM levels (AFI33-138, 2005).    
Although these externally controlled systems provide a service to the Air Force and 
reside on its network, the TCNO testing and installation processes for these assets are 
dictated and managed, to a large extent, by the PMOs.  Because there are a large number 
of PMOs, each with their own testing and implementation procedures, TCNO compliance 
amongst these machines often exceeds the mandated Air Force time frame.  As a result, 
























































Figure 1: Security Vulnerabilities Reported 1995-2006 (CERT 2006) 
Background 
In 2003, the Air Force Chief Information Officer expressed an organizational goal 
of reducing TCNO deployment time to twenty-four hours, from initial release to patch 
installation (Gilligan, 2003).  This direction, coupled with the increasing awareness that 
TCNO installation is both a necessary and growing function has spurred numerous 
process improvement initiatives.  When security patching was in its infancy, network 
patches were installed manually, which was a labor intensive and unrelenting process.  
With the introduction of centrally managed, electronic installation methods, many of 
today’s TCNOs are installed remotely on a large scale.  However, because PMO assets 
are unique in the software applications they run, TCNOs must be extensively tested prior 
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to installation on these machines.  As a result, remote installation is not an option and in 
most cases prohibited by Air Force instruction (AFI33-138, 2005).  Instead, the PMO 
office responsible for the system to receive the TCNO must first determine applicability 
of the patch, and if it is deemed appropriate, test the patch prior to allowing installation 
on its machines.  This testing and installation process is not overseen by the Air Force 
and as a result, time frames of TCNO installation amongst PMOs can vary considerably.   
The current AF method to track and manage the TCNO process amongst its many 
PMOs is extremely limited and fragmented at best.  According to the AFNOSC, there is 
currently “no way of tracking or verifying what individual PMOs do for testing TCNO 
applicability” (Matthews, 2006).  New, upcoming systems are anticipated to provide the 
capability for remote “remediation” or application of the TCNO, without the need for 
excessive coordination through MAJCOMs and base-level entities.  However, “most if 
not all PMO systems will be put into an “exceptions” list for remediation” (AFNOSC, 
2006), and therefore will not benefit from such process improvements.  The AF uses a 
tool called the TCNO Dashboard to track PMO TCNO compliance.  When using this 
tool, PMOs must register their TCNO assessment/testing program for review and 
acknowledge and update their status for each TCNO that is released by the AFNOSC.  
However, at this time “less than 10% of PMO are registered within the TCNO 
Dashboard” (AFNOSC, 2006) and there is no policy mandating them to do so.  
Additionally, since this is an AFNOSC tool meant for AF level-PMOs, it only tracks a 




There is no current or planned, standardized method to release TCNOs to PMOs 
within the AF.  Some are notified and tracked through a portal by the AFNOSC, while 
others are notified and tracked via secure email by MAJCOM NOSCs.  While AFI 
mandates that PMOs are responsible for establishing procedures to evaluate applicability 
to their systems, there are no quality checks, standardization requirements or oversight to 
ensure the results of such evaluations are sound.  Nonetheless, these PMO systems 
directly impact the security of the Air Force Network and the Department of Defense at 
large.  
Previous thesis research has examined the Air Force TCNO creation and 
implementation process in an effort to identify shortfalls and offer suggestions for 
improvement and further research (Kubinsky, 2004).  One of the identified problems in 
this thesis was the lack of a standardized process governing TCNO disbursement to 
PMOs.  Also identified was an unnatural order of events for TCNO distribution events 
which prevents the PMO offices from receiving TCNOs in a timely manner.  However, 
the research did not examine in any detail individual PMO testing and implementation or 
distribution procedures for TCNOs and as a result recommended this as a future research 
consideration.  A request for further research has come from the AFNOSC, which is 
currently putting together a plan to improve the Air Force’s TCNO process and has yet to 




 In order to improve existing PMO patch management methods, we must examine 
the entire process including patch distribution, assessment, testing, patching and reporting 
practices used by PMOs operating within the bounds of the Air Force network.  
 Air Force instruction 33-138 states “the goal of the TCNO process is the 
mitigation of risk to the AFEN through the implementation of network vulnerability 
countermeasures” (AFI 33-138, 3.16) and “achieving 100% compliance with all TCNOs 
is and will remain the ultimate goal to ensure the security and integrity of the AFEN and 
the information contained therein” (AFI 33-138, 3.31).  It goes on to state that “the timely 
up-channel flow of TCNO compliance statistics through the AFNETOPS hierarchy 
provides a picture of overall risk to the AFEN and Air Force information systems” (AFI 
33-138, 3.28), establishing a direct relationship between timely TCNO deployment and 
network security.  Consequently, this study will examine whether the lack of 
standardized, centrally managed, and enforced security patching procedures for Air Force 
PMO assets leads to lateness of network system TCNO compliance and in turn, weakens 
the security of the Air Force Network by addressing the following questions:  
 
RQ1).  How does the lack of standardized, centrally managed, and enforced 
TCNO patching procedures for PMO impact the TCNO compliance timeframe 




SRQ1). How do the methods of TCNO distribution (both to and from the 
PMOs) impact the TCNO compliance timeframe?  
 
SRQ2).  How do PMO applicability assessment methods impact the 
TCNO compliance timeframe? 
 
SRQ3).  How do PMO testing methods impact the TCNO compliance 
timeframe? 
 
SRQ4).  How do PMO patching methods impact the TCNO compliance 
timeframe? 
 
SRQ5).  How do PMO reporting methods impact the TCNO compliance 
timeframe? 
 
SRQ6).  Are there any additional organizational behavior issues that might 
impact the TCNO compliance timeframe? 
 
Assumptions/Limitations 
Patch management and the implementation of security patches is just one of 
numerous security management practices that are necessary for maintaining appropriate 
levels of network security.  Other methods including firewalls, user education, passwords 
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etc., while important, are beyond the scope of this research and will therefore only be 
addressed as reference points as deemed necessary by the author.  Furthermore, the 
argument for or against the use of patch management as an effective security practice will 
not be considered.  Since it is a widely accepted practice across industries and 
organizations including the Air Force, the need for a patch management process is 
assumed for the purposes of this study.   
The process of patch management spans the entire Air Force organization.  While 
focusing solely on PMO patch management narrows the focus considerably, it is still 
unfeasible to consider studying all PMOs and associated processes in the time frame 
allotted for this study.  Therefore, some decisions will be made as to which PMOs and 
Air Force organizations will be studied within the context of this problem.  Additionally, 
while there are numerous steps in the patch management process, this study will not 
address the processes of initially identifying network vulnerabilities or creating the initial 
TCNO.  Instead, it will begin at the point of distribution and follow the TCNO through 
the PMO evaluation, testing and installation processes.  The Air Force TCNO installation 
process will be examined on a limited basis only for the purpose of comparing TCNO 
compliance rates with those of PMOs.    
Benefits/Implications 
Information systems are only as good as the security patches that have been 
applied (Qualls, 2004).  “It only takes one missed or improper patched system to 
jeopardize the whole computing environment in an organization” (Chan, 2003).  Without 
a standardized process to ensure patching is completed in a timely manner, the Air Force 
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runs the risk of compromising the security of it network and the mission-critical 
information contained within.  To illustrate this security risk, TCNO compliance data 
collected over a five year period shows that PMO assets accounted for over 189,000 
security vulnerabilities on the Air Force Network (Action Tracker historical data, 2001-
2006).  As a result, PMO systems that reside on the AF Network must be governed by 
such a process to ensure their compliance with Air Force security standards.  By 
examining existing PMO patch management processes, this study should provide a better 
understanding of the processes used by PMOs to determine applicability, test, and 
implement Air Force directed TCNOs and how those processes fit into the overall AF 
TCNO management process with the intent of identifying any weaknesses in the current 
processes and offer recommendations to the Air Force as to how to address such 
weaknesses.      
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II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to expand upon the information presented in 
Chapter 1 through relevant literature.  First, applicable regulations that govern the Air 
Force TCNO process will be addressed to provide a basic understanding of the 
regulations that Air Force organizations and PMOs must adhere to when conducting 
patch management.  Following, the major steps of a successful patch management 
program will be examined by presenting professional literature to provide a thorough 
understanding of the process and introduce some commonly used “best practices” among 
various organizations.           
Air Force Instruction 
Agencies and their responsibilities 
The Air Force TCNO process is governed by Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-138.  
This instruction outlines the roles and responsibilities of all applicable organizational 
units interfacing with the Air Force network.  A hierarchal representation appears in 
Figure 2.  For the purposes of this study, the process is limited to the AFNOSC and all 
organizations within its purview, so the discussion of the responsibilities of JTF-GNO 
will be limited.  Also, a System Program Office (SPO) has the same function of a PMO, 
but usually comes under the administrative authority of Air Force Material Command or 
Air Force Space Command.  For the purposes of this study SPOs and PMOs will be 





Figure 2: Air Force TCNO notification and tracking hierarchy (AFI 33-138, 2005) 
      
    JTF-GNO 
The responsibilities of JTF-GNO (USSTRATCOM) are outlined in Chairmen of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice (CJCSN) 6510.01 CH 2, January 26, 2006.  JTF-GNO 
releases network vulnerability patches in the form of IAVAs, which are provided to the 
various Department of Defense (DoD) components for compliance.  The Air Force, being 
one such component, tracks these IAVAs as TCNOs through the AFNOSC.  JTF-GNO 
monitors IAVA compliance and asset status across the DoD.  While understanding this 
relationship helps to see how the Air Force obtains some of its vulnerability patches, not 
all TCNOs are generated from DoD IAVAs.  Some TCNOs are generated by the 
AFNOSC and Air Force MAJCOMs in response to a perceived threat internal to the Air 
Force network and have no reporting relationship with JTF-GNO.  Additionally, the 
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policies and procedures associated with Air Force PMO compliance are not dictated by 
JTF-GNO, so their influence on the process of interest to this study is minimal.  
     AFNOSC 
According to AFI33-138, the AFNOSC serves as the Air Force office of primary 
responsibility to generate, disseminate, and track implementation of Air Force-level 
TCNOs (AFI33-138, 2005).  This study will limit its scope of the TCNO process from 
initial TCNO dissemination (from the AFNOSC to the PMOs) to installation and 
subsequent compliance.  As a result, the steps involved in TCNO generation will not be 
addressed.  The AFNOSC disseminates TCNOs to NOSCs, NCCs, and “all Air Force 
program offices not administratively assigned to AFMC” (AFI22-138:20).  
     NOSC 
Similarly, the Network Operations Center (NOSC) is responsible for 
acknowledging, disseminating, implementing, tracking and reporting TCNOs (AFI33-
138, 2005:14).  Air Force NOSCs reside at the MAJCOM level which report directly to 
the AFNOSC.  As illustrated in figure 1, some PMOs fall under direct responsibility of 
the AFNOSC and receive their TCNO inputs accordingly.  There are however, other 
MAJCOM-level PMOs that do not interact with the AFNOSC directly.  The NOSC has 
the responsibility of disseminating implementing, tracking and reporting TCNO 
compliance for these PMOs.  The NOSC “disseminates TCNOs to all NCCs within its 





    PMO 
The Program Management Office (PMO) serves as the office of primary 
responsibility to process, evaluate, test, and coordinate TCNOs and risk mitigating 
countermeasures for those functional systems for which they are responsible.  
Furthermore, they “determine a TCNO’s applicability, risks, vulnerabilities, and impact” 
to their programs and systems and “ensure there is a countermeasure developed for every 
applicable TCNO” (AFI33-138, 2005: 16).  When a TCNO is released, it is the PMO’s 
responsibility to determine if that vulnerability applies to the software on their system.  If 
it does apply, the PMO must properly test that patch to ensure it will not unnecessarily 
disrupt the system.  When the patch is deemed safe, the PMO gives notice to the 
appropriate agency (AFNOSC or NOSC) and either provides the patch to that agency or 
directly to a functional system administrator (FSA) for installation.   
In some cases, the PMO must forward the TCNO to a Joint PMO for evaluation.  
This occurs when the program in question is not overseen by the Air Force or if the 
TCNO was not generated as the result of a DoD IAVA.  For example, if JTF-GNO 
releases an IAVA to the Air Force, which in turn releases it as a TCNO, the joint PMO 
office has already verified the vulnerability patch at the JTF-GNO level and further 
coordination is not necessary.  If however, the AFNOSC releases a TCNO based upon a 
vulnerability unique to the Air Force, the TCNO must be forwarded back to the joint 
PMO office to determine applicability and to conduct the appropriate testing before 
installation.   
Per AFI33-138, there are five situations that PMOs must establish procedures for: 
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1) The TCNO does not apply to the program 
2) The TCNO applies to the program and the FSAs are authorized to 
implement the countermeasure according to the procedures contained in 
the TCNO. 
3) The TCNO applies to the program but the FSAs are not authorized to 
implement the countermeasure according to the procedures contained in 
the TCNO. 
4) The TCNO applies to the program but actual implementation 
procedures are not yet available.  
5) The applicability of the TCNO to the program is not known at this time. 
 
For each of the above situations, the PMO must utilize the ENOSC web-based 
status page to maintain status information and notify the parent organization (MAJCOM 
or AFNOSC) as soon as applicability is determined. 
     NCC 
The Network Control Center serves as the wing/base officer of primary 
responsibility to acknowledge, disseminate, and implement TCNOs and to track and 
report compliance with TCNOs (AFI-33-138, 2005: 15).  While they are primarily 
focused on Air Force owned system compliance, NCCs often act as the reporting agency 
for PMOs that reside at a base or wing level.  In some cases, NCCs have patching 
authority of the PMO asset, if that asset resides under NCC operational control.      




      FSA 
Functional System Administrators are responsible for applying TCNOs to PMO 
assets.  FSAs may receive their guidance and authorization to apply the TCNO patch 
from the NOSC, NCC or directly from the PMO depending upon the established 
agreement.   
TCNO Composition 
Every TCNO released by AFNOSC is assigned a priority and related suspense 
date.  The priorities, which can be seen in Table 1, range from critical to low depending 
on the threat to the Air Force network the associated vulnerability has. 
 
Table 1: Air Force TCNO priority categories 
Priority Description 
Critical Widespread and imminent/ongoing threat to the AFEN and supported operations 
Serious Widespread threat to the AFEN and supported operations is expected. 
High Threat to the AFEN and supported operations is likely 
Medium Threat to the AFEN is possible but is mitigated by such factors as difficulty of 
exploitation, limited deployment of vulnerable operating systems, etc. 
Low Threat to the AFEN is unlikely due to the assessed difficulty of exploiting the 
vulnerability 
Source: Adapted from AFI33-138, Table 3.1 
 
In addition, each TCNO will have multiple suspense dates dictated by the 
associated TCNO priority category.  These dates can be seen in Table 2.  The receipt 
acknowledgement date is the “date by which tasked organizations will acknowledge 
receipt of the TCNO to their next higher echelon” (AFI33-138:18).  The initial 
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compliance statistics date is the “date by which tasked organizations will provide their 
first compliance statistics update to their next-higher echelon” (AFI33-138:18).  This date 
is often omitted from NOSC released TCNOs.  The compliance date is the “date by 
which tasked organizations must achieve full compliance with the implementation 
mandated by the TCNO” (AFI22-138:18).   These suspense dates may also be influenced 
by the originating organization.  For example, if JTF-GNO releases a vulnerability patch 
with a suspense date of 1 June, the AFNOSC will likely release its corresponding TCNO 
with a suspense date prior to 1 June, allowing adequate time to meet the JTF-GNO 
suspense.  Similarly, the NOSC will release this same TCNO to its NCCs and PMOs with 
a suspense date prior to the AFNOSC date to ensure compliance.   
 
Table 2: Air Force TCNO suspense dates 








If the TCNO 
priority is: receipt acknowledgment 
date will be  
initial compliance 
statistics date will be 
compliance date 
will be 
1 Critical £ 15 days 
2 Serious £ 30 days 
3 High £ 45 days 
4 Medium 
5 Low 
£ 24 hrs after TCNO 
release 
the first Monday after 
TCNO release 
£ 60 days 
Source: Adapted from AFI33-138, Table 3.2 
 
In order to effectively monitor the status of vulnerability patches across the Air 
Force, each TCNO is assigned a tracking number.  The standard format for this tracking 
number is a four-digit year, followed by the three digit Julian date, and a three-digit 
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increment number (AFI-33-138).  For example, the first TCNO released by the AFNOC 
on 19 January 2006 would be “TCNO AFNOSC 2006-19-001”.  Any revisions to this 
TCNO would result in appending this number with an alphabetical character.  The first 
revision to the TCNO in this example would be annotated as “TCNO AFNOSC 2006-19-
001a”.   
In addition to priorities, suspense dates and tracking numbers, TCNOs typically 
have implementation details which provide step-by-step implementation instructions, 
downtime estimates, projected risks and any other information deemed necessary to 
ensure proper compliance (AFI33-138, 2005:19).  These implementation details are 
dictated by the TCNO generating organization, but may be augmented by other 
organizations (NOSCs, NCCs, PMOs) as deemed necessary.   
 
Dissemination methods 
Per AFI33-138, the AFNOSC will maintain a single distribution list of all Air 
Force units that receive AFNOSC-generated TCNOs (AFI33-138, 2005:20).  In addition, 
TCNOs will be disseminated via secure electronic email (SIPRNET) and/or eTANG 
(AFI33-138, 2005:20).   
 
Extensions 
In some cases, extensions may be granted to PMOs in an effort to achieve full 
TCNO compliance.  Extensions must have definite timeframes and the approving 
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authority depends upon the number of extensions previously granted for the TCNO (see 
Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Air Force TCNO extension approval process 




If the extension 
requested is a 
And it is being 
requested by the 
Then it must be 





1 NCC wing/base DAA 
2 NOSC first Colonel in 
NOSC chain of 
command 





PMO/SPO program manager functional 
system DAA 
5 NCC wing/base DAA and 
MAJCOM DAA 
6 NOSC MAJCOM DAA 
7 FOA/DRU NCC/MSC FOA/DRU DAA 
8 
second extension 




9 NCC wing/base DAA and 
MAJCOM DAA 
10 NOSC MAJCOM DAA 
11 FOA/DRU NCC/MSC FOA/DRU DAA 
12 
third extension 
PMO/SPO functional system 
DAA 
AFNETOPS/CC
Source: Adapted from AFI33-138, Table 3.4 
 
Compliance Reporting 
 TCNO compliance is realized when all actions directed in that TCNO are 
accomplished on all affected assets (AFI33-138, 2005:27).  For each TCNO implemented 
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on a functional (PMO) system, a functional system administrator will record the 
following information (as outlined in section 3F of AFI33-138 dated 28 November 2005): 
• The name, rank, unit, office symbol, phone number, and e-mail address for the 
person who implemented the TCNO. 
• The Date receipt of the TCNO was acknowledged to the host NCC 
• Exception details (if any), including any reason the TCNO was not accomplished 
as instructed 
• The date compliance was achieved, verified, and reported to the host NCC. 
MAJCOM Guidance 
In addition to Air Force instructions, MAJCOMs may supplement their TCNO 
program guidance with additional written guidance.  For example, Air Combat Command 
(ACC) released the Special Instructions to Communicators (Spin-C).  This instruction 
applies to all NCCs that fall under direct control of ACC.  Contained within the SPIN-C 
is a section that outlines the TCNO process mandated for ACC.    This guidance is meant 
to complement the Air Force instruction with MAJCOM-specific instructions for TCNO 
dissemination, installation, reporting and tracking.  The ACC guidance does specify the 
exclusion of AF-level PMOs, which are governed by AFNOSC guidance directly.   
Pending Guidance 
The Air Force is authoring a new guidance (currently in draft form) known as the 
Vulnerability Lifecycle Management System (VLMS) Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS).  This document is meant to strengthen the procedures the Air Force currently 
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uses for securing its network in an effort to gain “improved centralization of command 
and control for AF Network Operations” (VLMS CONOPS, 2006:.2).  Specifically the 
CONOPS is meant to “identify roles and responsibilities and operational requirements 
associated with the new Vulnerability Lifecycle Management System which will provide 
an automated way to “analyze the capabilities of existing USAF IT investments, identify 
gaps in capabilities, leverage current capabilities”, and achieve improved vulnerability 
and configuration management across the Air Force networks (VLMS CONOPS, 
2006:2).  
An admitted shortfall of this new plan is the fact that it does not mitigate the 
problem of manual patch installation that PMO systems present.  Since PMO assets still 
rely on disparate processes that span multiple organizations, automation is not yet an 
option.  In fact, according to the AFNOSC “most if not all PMO systems will be put into 
an “exceptions” list for remediation” (Matthews, 2006), and therefore will not benefit 
from such process improvements.   
Accepted Patch Management practices 
Patch (TCNO) management is a relatively new practice which has gained 
increased exposure over the last few years as computer technology and the need to 
protect the data contained within has crept into nearly every facet of organizational 
processes.  Because it is in its relative infancy there is limited established theory on the 
subject.  Instead, most literature addresses best practice ideas and recommended 
standards for implementing patch management in an organization.  In addition, much of 
the recent literature on patch management addresses automated tools used to install these 
20 
 
patches, which in the case of this study are not applicable due to the complexities and 
varying testing procedures that PMO systems require.  Accordingly, such environmental 
complexity has been classified as “a barrier to automated patch management” because of 
the need to determine the appropriateness of each patch and test the patch against each 
possible configuration (Colville, et al., 2002).  In such instances, “enterprises need to 
recognize the impact that an unstructured environment has on their ability to rapidly 
deploy change with a confidence that unexpected results will not occur” (Colville, et al. 
2002).   
The remainder of the literature review will focus on literature as it pertains to the 
steps currently required for PMOs in an effort to determine recommended practices 
organizations follow in each.  These steps are: dissemination, applicability assessment, 
testing, installation, and reporting.  However, prior to undertaking these steps, there are 
two additional “best practices” echoed by numerous articles and industry professionals 
that apply to this study and bear mentioning: having a standardized process and 
maintaining an accurate system inventory.  
Standardized Process 
Devising an effective patch management program goes beyond identifying key 
roles and responsibilities.  All written policies, procedures and tools must be standardized 
across the organization (GAO, 2003:12).  Failing to do so introduces the risk of creating 
fragmented, ah-hoc processes and allowing subgroups within the organization to 
implement patch management differently or not at all (GAO, 2003:12).   All such policies 
and procedures should be clearly documented and organized so that they can survive staff 
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turnover and resulting loss of institutional knowledge.  This is especially true with 
personnel dependent processes such as applicability assessment and testing (Voldal, 
2003).  A key to ensuring standardization is having one, centralized organizational unit 
oversee the entire patch management process.  Having a patch management process 
governed by decentralized units presents the unnecessary challenge of each unit devising 
its own methods and due to the resulting lack of standardization, often results in disparate 
processes and approaches (Barney, 2005).  The requirement of standardized policies and 
procedures must apply to all internal and external organizations that interface with the 
network, a lesson NASA learned when implementing its own patch management system 
in 2004 (Jackson, 2005).  In addition, there must be procedures in place to monitor and 
enforce these policies to ensure compliance (Jackson, 2005).   
A major part of this standardized process is setting an agreed upon timeframe.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, all patches released by the Air Force are assigned a 
time frame for completion.  Such a time frame is necessary to assure that the patch 
management process is not drawn out and left incomplete (Schouten, 2003).  However, if 
the steps of this timeline are not efficiently ordered, the allotted timeframe may not be 
met.  This timeframe is a large part of the measurement process of this study.  In an effort 
to identify and disseminate leading performers’ practices, an organization should as itself 
the following questions: “Is the organization responding in a timely fashion to alerts and 
patches? If not, why not, and what risks does this pose for the organization? What parts 
of the company are doing better than other parts and why?” (Brykczynski & Small, 2003)       
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  Organizations “cannot succeed without establishing a well-defined process” for 
patch management (Brandman, 2005).  As a 2004 GAO report points out, “Without 
consistent implementation of patch management practices, agencies are at increased risk 
of attacks that exploit software vulnerabilities on their systems” (GAO, 2004:11).    
Accurate system inventory 
As the old saying states, “You cannot manage what you don’t know.”  This 
concept is a summary of Lord Kelvin’s statement “I often say that when you can measure 
what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; 
but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge 
is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you 
have scarcely in your thoughts advanced to the state of Science, whatever the matter may 
be" (Kelvin, 1883).  Therefore, in order for a patch management plan to be 
comprehensive and effective, the devices that it supports must be known.  Accordingly, 
experts recommend collecting and actively maintaining an active IT inventory of every 
machine in the organization (Chan, 2003).  This is not limited to user workstations, but 
includes every single device that has an embedded computer device (Chan, 2003:6).  
While the content and level of detail of the information collected for each device may 
vary slightly among organizations, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
recommends, at a minimum, collecting information regarding the device’s hardware, 
operating system and any major applications that reside on that device (Mell & Tracy, 
2002:26).  While this is an admittedly daunting task for large, heterogeneous 
organizations, it is necessary to understanding the possible complications caused by a 
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complex and expansive computer environment.  Because it is such a large undertaking, 
automated tools and software packages are frequently used to collect this data (Roberge, 
2004: 8).   
Aside from providing an overall idea of what systems and related vulnerabilities 
exist on an organization’s network, an accurate system inventory provides the means to 
categorize and prioritize patching based upon system threat level, vulnerability, and 
criticality (Mell & Tracy, 2002:26).  A systems threat level is dictated by its potential to 
cause harm to another system or the network (Mell & Tracy, 2002:26).  Systems that face 
high threat levels are usually those that are accessible to external users such as Web or 
email servers or those that contain critical or sensitive information such as financial, 
personnel or proprietary information.  A vulnerable system is one that has a “flaw, 
misconfiguration, or weakness that allows the security of the system to be violated” (Mell 
& Tracy, 2002:26).  Web servers often introduce vulnerabilities due to their relative ease 
of access from external users.  A system’s criticality is measured by its importance to the 
organization (Mell & Tracy, 2002:26).  By identifying those systems that impose a high 
level of threat to the network, are highly vulnerable and are critical, an organization can 
prioritize its assets and determine which should be patched first.  In addition, an 
inventory provides the means to determine which patches are applicable to which 
machines and who is responsible for them (GAO, 2003:12).  Unlike the inventory 
process, categorization and prioritization is very difficult to automate because assigning a 
priority is often a subjective process dictated by organizational practices and personnel 
expertise (Roberge, 2004: 8).    
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An accurate system inventory also acts as a change catalyst (Wrenn, 2004).  For 
example, frequent inventories will identify laptops and other portable devices that 
intermittently connect to the network (Wrenn, 20004).  They also provide a means to 
identify aging or unique operating systems and software products, recognize 
opportunities to further standardize network assets and in turn, reduce the number of 
vulnerabilities and ease of patching process (Wrenn, 2004).  
Finally, asset management must be a continuous process.  Hardware, software and 
system configurations are frequently updated, added or removed and the inventory must 
reflect these changes (Barney, 2005).   
TCNO Dissemination  
The underlying goal of an effective dissemination process is to produce an 
efficient method of quickly deploying a security patch to the organization (Dadzie, J, 
2005).  Dissemination includes both the method(s) used for deploying the patch as well 
as the timeframe in which the patch is distributed.   
The timeliness of the security patch dissemination process is what determines the 
level of risk the organization faces (Schwartz, 2004).  Automated patch distribution can 
make the patch dissemination process less cumbersome.  However, automation generally 
works best in organizations with a heterogeneous environment with standardized 
configurations (Mell, 2002).  As previously discussed, Air Force PMOs systems are not 
standardized and therefore cannot be automatically updated.  Those organizations that 
cannot automate their patch dissemination must rely on alternate methods (Voldal, 2003).  
For example, to disseminate to its unmanaged clients, Microsoft uses a corporate-wide 
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email system to provide information and links to its security patches which are located in 
a centralized location for download (Alliegro, 2003).      
In most organizational patch management environments, patch dissemination 
occurs after assessment and testing and is part of the installation process.  However, per 
Air Force Instruction, the TCNO must be distributed to PMOs from the AFNOSC, and 
subsequently from a MAJCOM (if applicable) before PMOs can begin any assessment or 
testing.   Recent research examined the Air Force’s patch management process 
(Kubinsky, 2004), in which the author identifies potential shortfalls including the PMO 
patch distribution being out of sequence. He suggests that rather than PMOs assessing 
applicability and testing TCNOs after they are released, these steps should be moved to 
the beginning of the process so that they can be conducted in conjunction with associated 
AF testing.   
Assessment 
Prior to the testing and implementation process, experts highlight the importance 
of assessing the risk of the patch and determining if it is applicable to the system in 
question (Schouten, 2003).  If a given vulnerability applies to something that does not 
exist on the network in question, there is no need to patch (Barney, 2005).  For example, 
if the vulnerability applies to Microsoft Windows and the system does not run the 
Windows operating system, the vulnerability patch is not likely to be applicable.  This is 
where an accurate system inventory will prove helpful.  Knowing what exists in the 
organization allows administrators to determine if a security patch will apply to the 
patching environment.  Only deploying those patches that are relevant to the 
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organizational environment will decrease the overhead and effort required to maintain 
security (Microsoft, 2006).   
  An additional aspect to consider when assessing a security patch is whether the 
organization wants to assume the risk of installing the patch.  Many security patches 
require reboots and machine downtime.  Often the systems being patched are considered 
operationally critical and any considerable downtime could prove costly.  These costs 
must be weighed against the risk imposed by the vulnerability.    Organizations should 
have a risk assessment standard to use when making such decisions (Chan, 2003).  A 
widely held view by experts is that the cost of implementing a patch should be less than 
the risk posed by its vulnerability (Barker, 2006).  To properly assess the risk of a 
security patch prior to installation, an organization should consider the importance of the 
system, the criticality of the vulnerability and the risk of applying the patch (GAO, 
2003:12).   
Testing in a heterogeneous environment 
Testing is a necessary step in the patch management process.  Failure to properly 
test a patch can result in unanticipated damage to the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability to an organization’s network, systems or data (Grigg & Oleksak, 2004).  To 
illustrate the importance of testing, consider the fact that 90% of the companies who did 
not test patches before they were deployed on production systems reported system 
outages (Perez, 2001). Because the numerous and diverse PMO systems contribute to the 
heterogeneous nature of the Air Force network, a “one-size fits all” approach to patch 
management is not feasible.  Such a complex environment increases the need for proper 
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testing prior to patch release.  In a highly structured environment, a system update can be 
tested once and widely deployed.  However, in a complex environment there is more 
overhead and delay associated with quality assurance testing (Colville, et al., 2002).   
While testing is necessary, it must be controlled and specified in advance so that it 
can be built into the overall process and timeframes can be anticipated.  Testing 
procedures should be part of an overall testing plan that is comprehensive, yet 
generalized enough to be followed for every new patch encountered (Walther, 2004).  To 
accomplish this, some companies maintain virtual machines on which administrators can 
pre-install and pre-configure test environments with different system configurations, and 
store them in a mass storage, saving time, necessary personnel and resources (Chang, et 
al., 2005). 
A test environment should mimic the production environment as close as possible, 
with every type of platform in the organization represented (Voldal, 2003).  Also, those 
involved in the testing process should have expertise in mission critical systems and 
possess the ability to verify the stability of those systems after the patch is installed 
(Voldal, 2003).  When testing an organization should follow some important steps (Grigg 
& Oleksak, 2004): 
• Always verify the source 
• Always virus scan the patch 
• Ensure the patch: corrects the vulnerability, does not open an old vulnerability, 
does not introduce a new vulnerability, does not degrade system performance and 
is compatible with all other required applications.   
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Organizations should have a contingent plan in case the security patch causes 
unwanted damage (Chan, 2003).  This contingent plan must also be tested to ensure 
timely remediation (Chan, 2003).  The testing process can add unwanted time to the 
overall patch management process.  While patches are being tested, organization should 
be aware of possible workarounds to provide temporary remediation until the patch is 
ready for deployment (GAO, 2003:13).   
If, after testing the patch, it is deemed to risky to install the patch across the 
organization, the details of the decision should be formally documented for future 
reference (Grigg & Oleksak, 2004).   
Installation 
While a large part of the installation process actually has to do with distribution, 
which has already been addressed, there are some additional considerations that 
organizations should consider.  As was previously addressed, automated installation is 
often not possible with PMO systems, so manual installation methods are necessary. 
Since manual installation relies on administrators at remote locations, it is imperative that 
a security patch have detailed installation instructions (Grigg & Oleksak, 2004).   In an 
effort to ensure a level of control and standardization, organizations may want to consider 
instituting technical and/or procedural controls to ensure only certain individuals may 
install security patches (Chan, 2004).   
Security patching often involves system reboots and resulting system disruptions.  
Therefore organizations should consider scheduling their patch installations after peak 
business hours, especially for mission-critical systems.  Prior to patch installation, 
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administrators may also want to consider backing up the systems to allow for restoration 
in case of an error during installation (Mell & Tracy, 2002).   
 
Reporting 
 Again, because most organizations are migrating towards an automated patch 
management solution, much recent literature focuses on automated reporting tools that 
communicate patch installation progress and success.  However, there are important 
points to consider no matter what the patching process is. 
Some experts recommend using a standardized form and an online system to 
report patching status (Nicastro, 2003).  This provides system administrators with the 
ability to report in an efficient manner as well as a consolidated means to track patching 
compliance in a distributed environment.  That being said, there should also be 
procedures in place to review this information on a regular basis to ensure compliance 
(Nicastro, 2003).   
Part of an effective reporting process includes maintaining good communication 
amongst all involved parties.  “All people involved in patch management in the 
organization should maintain good communication channels among them” (Chan, 2003). 
Everybody has to know his/her roles and responsibilities, what to do, and how to do it, so 
that no step of a process is missed. This is particularly important for global organizations 
such as the Air Force who have worldwide heterogeneous networks and computing sites 




This chapter examined applicable regulations that govern the Air Force TCNO 
process to provide a basic understanding of the process that Air Force organizations and 
PMOs must adhere to when conducting patch management.  In addition, the major steps 
of a successful patch management program were examined to provide a thorough 




III.  Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter discusses the methodology used for this research.  Specifically, it 
will address the type of design to be used, the study’s questions, units of analysis, data 
collection and data analysis strategies employed and the methods used to achieve 
validity.  
Type of design 
As illustrated by the research questions first presented in Chapter 1, the purpose 
of this research is to examine existing processes in used by PMOs with assets residing on 
the Air Force network and ultimately provide recommendations to improve existing PMO 
patch management methods.  The exploratory nature of this research is well suited to a 
multiple case study design.  Case study research is particularly appropriate for “sticky, 
practice-based problems where the experiences of the actors are important and the 
context of action is critical” (Benbasat, et al, 1987).  As this chapter will illustrate, the 
findings of this research will be derived directly from the implemented policies, practices 
and insight garnered directly from the research participants.    
The underlying goal of this research is to attempt to determine some differences 
in the way PMOs with shorter TCNO compliance rates operate compared to those PMOs 
with longer compliance rates.  Therefore, using a multiple-case design with theoretical 
replication is ideal.  Theoretical replication allows for the comparing and contrasting of 
multiple cases in order to find varying results for predictable reasons (Yin, 2003).  For 
32 
 
example, those PMOs with a shorter compliance timelines might have an explicitly 
defined testing process with set deadlines, whereas PMOs with longer compliance 
timelines do not.  Theoretical replication benefits from a case study design using 4 to 6 
cases (Yin, 2003).  Therefore, this case study design will examine 4 separate PMO 
organizations.  The method of selection for these PMOs is discussed in the Units of 
Analysis section of this chapter.     
Yin (2003) outlines five important concepts of a case study research design: 
 1. a study’s questions 
 2. it propositions, if any; 
 3. its unit(s) of analysis; 
 4. the logic linking the data to the propositions; and  
 5. the criteria for interpreting the findings. 
All five concepts will be addressed in this chapter.  Take note however, for the 
sake of clarity, the fifth concept (interpretation criteria) will be addressed following a 
discussion of the data collection strategies to be used in this study.  
A study’s questions 
 Yin provides a basic categorization scheme for the types of research questions 
that lend themselves to case study research: “who,” “what,” “where,” “how,” and “why.”  




RQ1).  How does the lack of standardized, centrally managed, and enforced 
TCNO patching procedures for PMO impact the TCNO compliance timeframe 
and in turn, the security posture of the Air Force Network? 
 
SRQ1). How do the methods of TCNO distribution (both to and from the 
PMOs) impact the TCNO compliance timeframe?  
 
SRQ2).  How do PMO applicability assessment methods impact the 
TCNO compliance timeframe? 
 
SRQ3).  How do PMO testing methods impact the TCNO compliance 
timeframe? 
 
SRQ4).  How do PMO patching methods impact the TCNO compliance 
timeframe? 
 
SRQ5).  How do PMO reporting methods impact the TCNO compliance 
timeframe? 
 
SRQ6).  Are there any additional organizational behavior issues that might 




As can be seen, the above questions are in the “how” form.  Although Yin would 
suggest that “how” questions typically are explanatory in nature, as previously stated, the 
design of this case study is exploratory.  That is not to say however, that the use of “how” 
questions in exploratory study design is uncommon.  In fact, a ten year study focusing on 
the use of case research in information systems found that the majority of case studies 
that posed “how” questions were exploratory in nature (Dube & Pare, 2001).   
Study propositions 
 Propositions are meant to direct attention to something that should be examined 
within the scope of the study (Yin, 2003).  The purpose of this research is clearly stated 
and the research questions, which are based upon actions mandated by Air Force 
regulation, are designed to provide the focus and direction that propositions are meant to 
provide.  That being said there are four additional propositions that can be made based on 
the purpose of this study as listed below: 
 
Proposition 1). High performing organizations have an accurate system inventory 
 
Proposition 2). Despite a possible similarity in TCNO compliance results, due to 
the lack of standardized TCNO processes, the methods of process execution will 




Proposition 3). There will be noticeable difference in the TCNO processes (or the 
execution of those processes) of high-performing and low-performing PMO 
organizations  
 
The first proposition addresses a key point made in Chapter II, which identifies 
having an accurate system inventory as being a key step in a successful patch 
management process.  Therefore, it would stand to reason that an organization that has a 
successful TCNO process would also have an accurate system inventory.  Since this 
important point is not addressed directly in the research questions, it is important to 
highlight here to ensure it receives proper attention throughout the course of this research 
effort.  The second proposition predicts that a lack of process standardization and 
centralized control will cause significant variation in the execution of TCNO processes 
amongst the PMOs studied for this research. The third proposition states that although 
processes will vary amongst all PMOs studied, something about them or their methods of 
execution will distinguish the high performing from the low-performing organizations.    
Unit(s) of analysis 
The problem of this thesis addresses TCNO programs at an organizational (PMO) 
level.  Therefore, the unit of analysis for this study will be a PMO.  That being said, data 
collection from individuals that operate within and in conjunction with these 
organizations will be necessary as these entities play a critical role in the success of the 
PMO TCNO process.  This data collection will be limited to those directly involved with 
the PMO TCNO process as is required to fully understand the organizational processes.  
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It may also be necessary to collect some degree of information from additional 
organizations that directly interact with PMOs in the context of the TCNO process.  The 
organizational units of analysis will consist of a representation of Air Force PMOs.  This 
will be limited to MAJCOMs or the AFNOSC, from which the PMO receives its TCNOs.    
Selection of the PMOs (and subsequent individuals) to study will depend on the 
initial data analysis.  To conduct this data analysis, an initial set of MAJCOM TCNO 
historical data will be statistically analyzed, to identify those PMOs with the best and 
worst average compliance rates.  MAJCOMs used for this initial data collection will be 
chosen based upon similarities of policies, procedures, and organizational size.  The type 
of information to be collected is specified later in this chapter. 
 Once this initial set of data is analyzed, two PMOs will be selected from each 
MAJCOM, one that is identified as performing well (with the best compliance 
timeframes) and one that has a noticeably longer TCNO implementation time frame.  
When selecting these four PMOs for further study, similarity in organizational size as 
well as the number and type of systems deployed on the AF network will be taken into 
consideration. 
Data collection strategies 
A case study examines a phenomenon in its natural setting, employing multiple 
methods of data collection to gather information from one or a few entities (people, 
groups, or organizations) (Benbasat, et al, 1987).   
One of the inherent problems with not having a standardized process to manage 
the TCNO process amongst PMOs is the lack of consolidated metrics and other 
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compliance data pertaining to the installation of PMO related TCNOs.  As a result, data 
collection will be a structured effort that addresses each major entity involved in the 
process, from the base level functional administrators and Network Control Center 
Personnel that install the TCNOs on the PMO assets, to the MAJCOM and AF level 
Network Operation Centers (NOSCs) which distribute TCNOs and report on their 
compliance.     
In order to gain a basic understanding of the Air Force PMO patch management 
landscape, data will first be collected to answer the following questions: “How many 
PMOs are connected to the AF network?” “How many PMO machines are on the AF 
network?”, “What are the functions and priority levels of PMO assets on the AF 
network?”, and “How many total machines comprise the AF network?”  Obtaining this 
data may prove difficult. Based on conversations with the AFNOSC, since not all PMOs 
are registered with the TCNO dashboard, there is no single record of Air Force PMOs or 
their respective systems.  Although not consolidated, this data should be available from 
the AFNOSC and the various AF MAJCOM NOSCs.  Knowing this basic information 
should provide enough information to measure the impact non-compliant PMO machines 
can have on Air Force network security.  
 Multiple data collection methods are typically employed in case studies research 
(Benbasat, et al., 1987) and this will be no exception.  Yin identifies several sources of 
evidence that lend themselves to case study research including documentation, archival 





In the context of case studies, documentation is useful for augmenting and 
corroborating evidence from other sources (Yin, 2003).  Just as useful, often 
documentation will not corroborate, but rather contradict evidence presented by other 
sources.  In such cases, further investigation should be conducted to determine the 
underlying facts (Yin, 2003).   
For the purposes of this research, documentation will be required from both the 
Air Force as well as the PMOs of interest.  Current documentation on Air Force TCNO 
processes and procedures while limited in content and dispersed across various 
regulations spanning from Air Force level agencies to individual MAJCOMs, provide a 
picture of how much of the process should be occurring.  It is important to understand 
these processes and ensure that all written procedures complement rather than contradict 
each other.  Once the Air Force process is understood and outlined, the same will be done 
for the PMOs of interest.  Studying their written policies and procedures for TCNO 
testing and implementation (from the time of receipt from the appropriate AF level 
organization to the time of deployment) should provide some insight as to how various 
PMOs vary in their methods.   
Archival Records 
Archival records can come in both electronic and hard copy form, however their 
usefulness often varies between case studies (Yin, 2003).  Archival records in the form of 
past TCNO compliance data will be imperative to this research for two reasons.  First, 
they will provide a measurement of how secure (or insecure) the AF network was at any 
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given time, due to non-compliant systems.  Second, this data will provide a timeline 
detailing initial release of the TCNO, receipt by the PMO, release of follow up TCNO by 
PMO (if applicable) and subsequent patching of machines, both PMO and Air Force.  
This will provide a good means for comparing patch deployment timeframes between Air 
Force and PMO entities. Each MAJCOM archives this data electronically.  Because this 
information is so dispersed and non-standardized, examining all of the TCNO data across 
the Air Force would be unrealistic.  Instead, two MAJCOMs will be selected and data on 
all TCNOs released within the last 5 years will be collected.  Not all TCNOs apply to all 
machines and most are software specific.  Therefore, data collection will be limited to 
only those TCNOs that affect both AF and PMO systems.  For each TCNO, specific 
criteria will be collected: Priority of TCNO, number of days between AF and PMO 
release (the time the PMO receives the patch to the time they release it for installation) 
and the disparity between AF and PMO compliance rates.  This will not only identify 
historical PMO process timeframes and compliance rates but will also provide a means to 
compare these rates to Air Force rates.    
What this data will not show is the testing process used by the PMOs.  This 
information will be gathered through documentation as previously mentioned, as well as 
through interviews of personnel involved in the PMO TCNO process.   
Interviews 
Interviews will be conducted with both AF and PMO personnel.  The first 
interview will be with the AFNOSC, as this is the entity responsible for developing the 
procedures and methods to attain TCNO compliance for the Air Force.  The AFNOSC 
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dictates and enforces any new policy that would standardize and govern PMO TCNO 
testing and deployment.  In addition to reporting compliance, it is developing new policy 
and methods that will govern the TCNO process for the entire Air Force.  Therefore, it 
has a good high-level view of the problems that the Air Force is facing with PMO TCNO 
patching and should provide good contacts for further interviews and research.  
Additionally, it is this office that is guiding the focus of this research, providing advice 
on scoping the problem as new issues arise.  In addition to the AFSNOC, interviews will 
be conducted at the NOSC and base levels to capture the PMO-related processes that 
occur at each.  Since NOSCs have the responsibility of notifying and reporting 
compliance of all PMO-related TCNO patches within their control, they should be able to 
provide methods both formal and informal that are used to track this information 
internally, as well providing other sources of data collection (additional documentation 
and archival data) that may shed some light on the process.  Similarly, it is the NCC’s 
responsibility to ensure compliance of base level PMO TCNO patches and report this 
compliance to the respective MAJCOM.  The individuals at these locations often have the 
most personal interaction with the FSAs responsible for loading TCNO patches on PMO 
machines and in the cases of some systems, may even act as the responsible FSA.  Once 
PMOs are selected based upon the initial data analysis, interviews will be conducted at 
the policy (PMO office) and implementation levels (FSAs) of the process to get an 
adequate view of the entire process.  These interviews will be focused and semi-
structured in design to provide participants the opportunity to interject information when 
they deem necessary while still allowing the researcher to guide the process with pre-
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determined interview questions.  This initial set of interview questions is included in the 
Case Study Protocol found in Appendix A. 
In an effort to gain adequate information to answer the sub-research questions 
(and ultimately the main research question), the data collection process must be detailed 
enough to gather specifics on each process in question.  Examples include determining 
the number of people involved in the process approval chain, whether there is a defined 
process schedule, levels of training and other items that may have an influence on the 
process timeline.   
Data analysis strategies 
Using multiple data collection methods provides a means for using triangulation 
to support the research questions, which in turn leads to a richer data analysis (Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2005).  For this exploratory case study, a cross-case synthesis analysis technique 
will be used.   With this strategy, will employ the use of a word table, which will be used 
to compare and contrast various aspects of the case study objectives as defined in the 
research questions.  The goal of a cross-case synthesis is to uncover patterns in the data 
that might ultimately lead to conclusions.  To conduct this analysis, PMOs selected for 
this study based on the criteria previously described will be compared once all data is 
collected.  The data will be organized by unit of analysis, in a method that facilitates 
comparison.  Data will be grouped by sub-research questions for ease of interpretation.  
This should allow for easier identification of patterns contained within the data.  The data 
will be synthesized and conclusions will be made based upon critical interpretation.  It is 
important to note that this form of analysis often relies heavily on argumentative 
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interpretation rather than numeric calculations, which is more subjective in nature (Yin, 
2003).   That being said, if the data allows, it may be possible to conduct a statistical 
analysis using a Chi Square analysis or similar method; however at this point it is 
difficult to determine whether the data will be too qualitative to employ statistical 
methods.  
Methods of achieving validity 
According to Yin (2003), the quality of a research design can be determined by 
four tests of validity: Construct Validity, Internal Validity, External Validity and 
Reliability.  Each will be addressed further below: 
Construct Validity 
Construct validity involves establishing correct operational measures for the 
concepts being studied (Yin, 2003).  Often the perceived subjective nature of case studies 
proves difficult to ensure construct validity.  However, there are some tactics that can be 
used to bolster this in a research design including using multiple sources of evidence, 
having key informants review the draft case study report, and establishing a chain of 
evidence (Yin, 2003).   
Collecting information from multiple sources of evidence allows for triangulation 
of the data sources, resulting in converging lines of inquiry (Yin, 2003).  This will likely 
further support the findings and accuracy of the study.  As previously outlined in data 
collection strategies section of this chapter, evidence will be collected from 
documentation, archival records and interviews, thereby utilizing multiple sources of 
evidence and in turn, bolstering construct validity.   
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Having informants review the draft case study report is intended to support the 
factual contents of the report.  A draft of this case study will be sent for review to all key 
research participants so that factual data contained within can be verified prior to 
finalization and publishing of the document.  Key research participants will include all 
interviewees from which data was collected to generate conclusions.  During this process, 
reviewers will examine the factual data contained within the case study report and submit 
comments as necessary.  Any comments that suggest factual data is misrepresented will 
lead to further evidence gathering until the reviewer is satisfied.  While this process may 
not result in complete agreement in amongst the reviewers regarding the researcher’s 
final conclusions, it should support the facts which are used to produce this studies’ 
findings (Yin, 2003).   
Internal Validity 
According to Yin (2003), “internal validity is only a concern for explanatory case 
studies”.  Since this is an exploratory case study design, internal validity will not be 
addressed further in this methodology discussion.    
External Validity 
External Validity determines whether a study’s findings are generalizable outside 
its immediate context (Yin, 2003).  The use of replication logic in a multiple case study 
design is a tactic to reinforce external validity. By generating conclusions from data 
gathered from multiple case studies, the findings of this case study should be adequately 





The goal of ensuring reliability is for investigators conducting the same case study 
using the same procedures to arrive at the same conclusions (Yin, 2003).  Two tactics can 
be used to increase the reliability of a study: the use of a case study protocol and the use 
of a case study database.  This research will employ the use of both tactics.   
The case study protocol is a tool designed to keep the researcher focused on the 
subject of the study as well as anticipate and prepare for potential problems (Yin, 2003).  
Yin (2003) suggests a case study protocol should have the following elements: 
• An overview of the case study project: objectives, background, relevant readings 
• Field procedures to be used: gaining access to sites, procedural reminders, etc. 
• Case Study Questions: the specific questions a researcher must keep in mind 
while conducting the research 
• A guide for the case study report: outline, data format, bibliographical 
information 
 Aside from the last item, a guide for the case study report, which is dictated by the 
Air Force Institute of Technology formatting standards, the case study protocol for this 
research contains all of these items.  Field procedures including those to use prior, during 
and after interviews are included in this document.  Outlining these procedures allows for 
duplication of the process, regardless of the researcher.  This is especially important in a 
multiple case design such as this one.  Due to its length, the case study protocol for this 
case study can be found in Appendix A. 
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 A case study database is meant to be a collection point for all of the raw data and 
information collected during the course of the investigation process of the research study.  
This may include case study notes, documents, quantitative tabular materials and 
narratives (Yin, 2003).  The database design for this research effort can be found in 
Appendix A. 
Overview of the Interview Process 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals directly involved in 
the PMO TCNO process from distribution to implementation and compliance reporting.  
Since the roles of the individuals varied, so to did the information that was gathered from 
each.  Therefore, each type of interviewee warranted a unique set of questions.  A 
complete list of these questions are contained within the Case Study Protocol found in 
Appendix A)   
Summary 
This chapter outlined the methodology used to conduct the research.  Specifically 
it outlined the case study approach, addressing the integral parts of case study as well as 
identifying data collection and analysis strategies and methods for achieving validity.  
Finally, a brief overview of the interview process was provided, which will be expounded 




IV. Analysis and Results 
Overview 
This chapter will present the analysis of the collected data and the results of the 
research.  Specifically, the initial data collected for the purposes of site selection will be 
described in detail the results of the analysis discussed.  Then, the site selection process 
will be outlined briefly.  Following, the interview results will be analyzed, compared and 
contrasted amongst the various sites to illustrate the processes used by each organization.  
Initial Data Collection and Analysis  
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, to facilitate an effective unit of analysis 
selection process, an initial set of TCNO historical data was to be statistically analyzed in 
order to identify those PMOs with the highest and lowest average compliance rates.  A 
database containing this historical data was provided by the AFNOSC.  (The basic 
structure of the tables from this database used for initial data collection along with the 
SQL commands written to extract the data can be found in Appendix B). This database 
contained five years of PMO TCNO compliance data (2001 to 2006) with a total of 751 
unique PMO entries.  However, many of these entries were repetitive, blank, incomplete 
and unintelligible and as a result, had to be combined or excluded from data analysis.  
Entries such as “XXX”, “9”, “PMO”, “Test” “Local PMO issues” and “none” could not 
be attributed to an existing Air Force PMO.  There were also entries such as “MS 
Windows” and “Office XP”, which are applications and not PMOs and thus could not be 
analyzed as such.  In addition, there were entries such as “Geobase” and “CE-Geobase”, 
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which while indicating the same system, are treated as separate entries in the database 
due to their unique spellings and formatting.  In fact, for one particular PMO there were 
over 42 different variations in spelling for the PMO name, causing 42 different database 
entries.   The historical data for these entries had to be manually combined as carefully as 
possible so that accurate performance measurements could be taken.  Some entries 
contained organizational units rather than PMO names.  For example PMO entries of 
“CES” and “CONS”, which while valid organizational units, do not indicate valid PMO 
names.  Following the adjustment of the database to compensate for these extraneous 
entries, there were a total of 424 PMO entries.  From these remaining entries in the 
database, a key set of data and statistics were gathered for analysis and final selection.  
These statistics can be broken down into three main categories: descriptive, performance 
and impact on network security. 
Descriptive Statistics 
These statistics were gathered for descriptive purposes and were not used to 
illustrate a PMO’s performance.  In doing so, they were also used to eliminate PMOs 
from further data analysis if certain criteria were not met.  The descriptive statistics 
gathered for this study were: total patches, number of units, and number of TCNOs. 
Total Patches: This is a measure of total work for each PMO.  It is the sum total 
of patches a PMO was tasked to install over the data collection period for all TCNOS 
where number of applicable PMO assets (machines) is greater than one.  This number 
does not necessarily represent the number of machines a PMO has deployed on the Air 
Force network.  For example, a PMO had two applicable TCNOs over the five year 
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period. The first TCNO affected six of the PMO’s assets and the second affected eight 
PMO assets.  In this example this PMO had fourteen total patches.  This situation, while 
purely hypothetical, is representative of the provided data and also raises an important 
issue: the number of machines each PMO actually has deployed on the Air Force network 
is not data that is readily available, nor can it be derived from the provided database.  
There is no way to tell from the provided data whether the PMO has a total of eight assets 
or if it had ninety but no more than eight were affected by these TCNOs.  The only thing 
that can be determined is that this particular PMO has at least eight assets on the Air 
Force Network.  Therefore, Total Patches while an accurate measure of total work does 
not provide a complete picture of the PMO asset landscape.  This measure was also used 
to eliminate extraneous data points.  PMOs with a Total Patches value of less than one 
were eliminated from the data set as they would have no performance data to measure. 
Following this elimination process, there were 240 PMOs remaining.   
Number of Units: This is a measure of geographic scope.  It represents the 
number of bases at which each PMO has TCNO-applicable assets.  This number was also 
used to eliminate extraneous data points as any PMO that has a Number of Units value 
less than two, was removed from the data set.  The rationale behind this was as follows.  
If a PMO is a poor performer at a single location, it may be due to existing circumstances 
(policy, procedures, infrastructure, etc) at that particular base and have little to do with 
the PMO itself.  If on the other hand, a PMO exists at a number of bases and is exhibiting 
poor performance at multiple locations, there is a greater chance that the issues exist at 
the PMO level rather than the base level.  While eliminating such PMOs from the data set 
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does not eliminate base-level issues, it does reduce the chances of such issues being the 
sole influence over TCNO compliance.  Following this removal process, there were a 
total of 70 PMOs remaining to be included in the analysis.   
Number of TCNOs: This is a measure of the applicable TCNOs for each PMO.  
Each TCNO for which a PMO had one or more applicable assets adds to the cumulative 
total of TCNOs for that PMO.  This descriptive statistic was used to calculate the 
performance statistic Average Days Overdue per TCNO (see below). 
The list was once again scrutinized to eliminate any extraneous or invalid names, 
which resulted in the removal of 24 additional entries, resulting in a list of 46 PMOs to be 
included in the historical performance analysis. 
Performance Statistics 
These statistics were used to rank order and in conjunction with the impact on 
network security statistics, ultimately select the highest and lowest performing PMOs 
based on a number of performance related categories.  The performance statistics used in 
this study were: average days overdue per TCNO, percent of overdue TCNOs, number of 
non-compliant TCNOs, and percent of non-compliant TCNOs.  
Average Days Overdue per TCNO: This is a performance measure of how many 
days overdue a PMO averages for each of its applicable TCNOs.  It was calculated by 
dividing a PMO’s total number of days overdue for each TCNO by the Number of 
TCNOs for that PMO.  This figure provides a statistical average of a PMO’s performance.  
Recall, overdue indicates the TCNO was at some point in time, past the compliance due 
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date provided in the TCNO. For the purposes of this data analysis, overdue is different 
than non-compliant (see below). 
Number of Non-Compliant TCNOs: This is a measure of both performance and to 
some extent, existing vulnerability.  For the purposes of this data analysis, non-compliant 
means past the compliance due date provided in the TCNO and not patched.  It is 
important to remember that a TCNO could have been overdue, even for a number of 
months or years, but if it has since been patched, it is now considered compliant.  For this 
reason, simply looking at the overdue or non-compliance data in isolation could be 
misleading.  An organization might be 100% compliant to date, but the time it took to 
comply with those TCNO may have consistently exceeded the mandated compliance 
date, which in reality points to poor patching performance. 
Percent Overdue TCNOs: This measure of performance represents what percent 
of a PMO’s total number of applicable TCNOs were overdue.  It was calculated by 
dividing number of overdue TCNOs by the total number of TCNOs.  Using a percentage 
for this performance statistic takes into account the total applicable TCNOs for each 
PMO and allows all PMOs to be analyzed equally.  For example, if PMO1 had two 
overdue TCNOs and PMO2 had 8, at face value, PMO1 was the better performer.  
However, if PMO1 only had two applicable TCNOs over the five year period whereas 
PMO2 had 100, clearly PMO2’s 8% overdue statistic is far better than PMO1’s 100% 
overdue statistic.   
Percent of Non-Compliant TCNOs: This measure of performance represents what 
percent of a PMO’s total number of applicable TCNOs were still non-compliant at the 
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time of data collection.  Using a percentage for this performance statistic takes into 
account the total applicable TCNOs for each PMO and allows all PMOs to be analyzed 
equally.  However, note that contrary to the overdue statistic, the raw number of non-
compliant TCNOs was used to analyze a PMO’s performance.  This is due to the fact that 
any rate of non-compliance is considered an existing security vulnerability and was 
therefore weighted heavier in the analysis of PMO performance.   
Impact on Network Security Statistics 
While nearly all of the performance-based statistics previously discussed can be 
considered network security vulnerabilities, two statistics in particular illustrate the 
overall impact an individual PMO has had on Air Force network security.  These 
statistics are: Number of overdue or non-compliant TCNOs with a rating of “Serious” or 
“Critical” and “Number of non-compliant patches”.  
Number of Overdue or Non-Compliant TCNOs with a priority of “Serious” or 
“Critical”: As discussed in Chapter 2, each TCNO is given a priority to both illustrate its 
threat level and to determine its mandatory compliance date, the two most severe of 
which are “Serious” and “Critical”.  This statistic represents the number of TCNOs with 
either priority a PMO allowed to become overdue or remain non-compliant. 
Number of Non-Compliant Patches: This is a measure of total existing 
vulnerability.  It represents the number of vulnerabilities for each PMO that remain un-
patched at the time of data collection.  This figure was calculated by multiplying a 
PMO’s Number of Non-Compliant TCNOs by the existing number of non-compliant 




In order to follow Human Subjects Research Guidelines and mask PMO 
identities, each PMO was assigned a unique number for identification.  The statistics 
identified in the previous section were calculated for each PMO in the database.  Each 
PMO ID was listed on a spreadsheet with their associated values of each of the statistics.  
These values were then used to rank order the PMOs within each statistic to determine 
the best and worst performers.   A matrix-style chart was used to plot the ranks of the 
PMOs and their associated ranks for each category.  These rankings can be found in 
Appendix B.  The rankings for each category were added, assigning each PMO a “score”.  
The two PMO with the lowest scores in both the lowest and highest performing matrix 
charts were selected for further study.  The statistics for these four PMOs can be seen 
below.   





Table 5: PMO Site Selection and Performance Data 
Top 2 Lowest Performing PMOs 
This table contains data on the two lowest performing PMOs determined from data analysis.  These PMOs will be used for final data 
analysis.  The complete list of rank ordered PMOs and their associated values can be found in Appendix D. 






























 Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value 
9 5 312 2 56 1 89 10 181.7 7 30.94% 9 91.16% 3 10,897 2 67 
16 1 1411 1 93 2 70 24 92.85 3 62.84% 15 88.51% 1 27,263 1 77 
 
Top 2 Highest Performing PMOs 
This table contains data on the two highest performing PMOs determined from data analysis.  These PMOs will be used for final data 
analysis.  The complete list of rank ordered PMOs and their associated values can be found in Appendix D. 






























 Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value 
5 1 0 1 0 2 1 8 34.5 1 0% 4 33.33% 33 67 10 3 
10 1 0 1 0 2 1 22 85.61 1 0% 3 16.67% 35 61 11 2 
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Interviewee Participants  
In all, 12 individuals were interviewed.   These 12 individuals were involved in 
one or more the various processes of TCNO administration for each PMO, from testing to 
implementation.  In addition, four of the interviewees were involved at a MAJCOM 
NOSC or NCC level, responsible not for a single PMO, but for overseeing the overall 
TCNO program for that entity.  This information was important to capture since these 
individuals enforce and manage many of the processes PMOs that interact at those levels 
are required to follow.   The interview pool was comprised of both military and civilian 
with an average of 2.45 years experience working with the Air Force TCNO process.  
Within each organization, each interviewee was assigned a number in succession.  This 
number coupled with an organizational identifier was used as a composite interviewee 
identifier (as shown in Table 6).  
Table 6: PMO Interviewee Information 
 
 
PMO Interviewee Information  
 
Interviewee  ID Job Description Role in TCNO process 
Experience with 




05_01 Programmer Acknowledgement, Applicability Assessment, Testing, Installation, Reporting Eight Months Yes 
10_01 Software Engineer Testing Two Years No 
10_02 IT Specialist Applicability Assessment, Installation, Reporting Eight Years Yes 
 
10_03 Security Acknowledgment  and Reporting Seven Years Yes 
09_01 Engineer Applicability Assessment, Testing Five Years Yes 
09_02 Network Administrator 
 
Installation, Reporting One Year No 
16_01 Test and Integration Acknowledgment, Testing Three Years Yes 
16_02 Network Administrator Installation, Reporting 
 
Six Months No 
NCC_01 Information Protection Acknowledgment and Reporting of all base level TCNO compliance stats Five Months Yes 
NOSC_01 Change Requests Oversee TCNO compliance Reporting for the entire MAJCOM Six Months Yes 
NOSC_02 Compliance Tracking TCNO compliance tracking and reporting for entire MAJCOM Two Years Yes 
One interesting item identified in the above table is that four of the interviewees 





The information gathered from all twelve interviewees was organized via “word 
tables” to enable data comparison and analysis.  For the purposes of analysis, the data 
was grouped according to sub-research question topics and the interviewee data was 
grouped according to organization within each word table.  A key point to remember 
when examining the interview data is that it is presented from an interviewee point of 
view and not the result of an analysis of quantitative, historical data.  It is important to 
gather such information to ascertain whether those directly involved with the processes 
believe they are successfully meeting any and all predefined criteria set by existing 
policies or instructions such as those found in AFI 33-138 and to then compare those 
responses from actual historical data to see whether they align.  Although written policies 
and procedures were requested from interviewee participants when relevant, none would 
accommodate this request as the interviewees felt providing this information would 


















PMO Interviewee Results—TCNO Distribution  
Organization Distribution Methods  Process Description 
05 Email  
The interviewee receives duplicate emails from two different sources—a parent organizational 








The principal method of distribution used amongst all organizations studied was 
email, although this was often supplemented with other methods due to inherent 
inefficiencies in the process.  For example, interviewees from PMO organizations 9 and 
10 noted the fact that the email notifications they receive often lag a day or more behind 
the posting of the TCNO notification to the PMO’s organizational website.  They 
therefore check the websites regularly in order to get a head-start on subsequent 
processes such as applicability assessment and testing. One of the other issues gleaned 
from the interviewees, is that in the case of PMOs 9 and 16, neither can have TCNOs 
loaded until the NCC receives an authorization email from the NOSC even though the 
Email, VMS 
The security office receives notice of a TCNO in the form of an IAVA from the Vulnerability 
Management System; the testing office receives an email from the security office and the 
individual responsible for installation receives duplicate emails from the security office as well 
as the PMO 
09 Email, Web 
The testing entity is notified via email from the TCNO-D, but also uses an organizational 
website as information often appears earlier; In addition, the installation entity receives 
notification that the TCNO has been tested and approved from the PMO website; however 
installation is not authorized until the email sent from the NOSC is received which, according 
to the interviewee, is often several days later. The installation entity must manually acquire the 
installation instructions and software patch from two separate websites using two separate sets 
of credentials. 
16 Email, Web 
The testing entity is notified via email from the TCNO-D but also uses the AFCERT website 
since information tends to be posted a day or two prior. Once tested, the respective NOSCS 
receive an email.  The NOSC sends an email to the base NCC Information Protection Office 
who forwards it to the appropriate installation entity. The entity responsible for installation 
receives an automated email from the PMO authorizing installation, however, implementation 
cannot occur until installation is not authorized until the email sent from the NOSC to the NCC 
and from the NCC to the Functional System Administrator responsible for implementation 
NCC Email, Action Tracker 
The NCC information protection office receives the majority of its notifications via a SIPRNet 
application known as Action Tracker.  This system is updated by the NOSC and contains 
information regarding all TCNOs applicable to NOSC and base-level assets.  This data used for 
site selection in this research effort was extracted directly from Action Tracker.  In addition, 
TCNO notification is supplemented by email from certain PMOs (as discussed above)  
NOSC Email, Action Tracker 
The NOSC receives notifications for the PMOs it monitors via email; it then distributes  TCNO 





PMO has already tested and approved installation on its systems.  This introduces an 
obvious delay in the overall process time, often amounting to days or weeks of additional 
lag time according to interviewee accounts. 
Even those that receive TCNO notification solely via email report shortcomings 
in the process. For example, the interviewee from PMO 5 expressed the fact that 
duplicate emails come from the TCNO-D site as well as from a parent organizational 
unit. 
The process of distribution actually includes two main components—distribution 
of TCNO notification and distribution of the actual software patch.  More often than not, 
these components are combined into one step, with the software patch attached or linked 
to the TCNO notification email.  However in the case of organization 9, the two 
components are kept separate.  Once the installation authority receives the TCNO 
notification and authorization to load, the Functional System Administrator (FSA) for 
organization 16 must go to two separate websites—one for the installation instructions 
and the other for the patch itself—both of which require separate login credentials.   
Of the individuals interviewed that have oversight of TCNO distribution from the 
PMO level, three felt their respective processes met or exceeded the mandated timelines.   
The interviewee with this level of oversight for PMO 9 felt their overall process leading 
up to and including distribution has improved greatly, but that TCNOs “sometimes are 












A process required by the Air Force and one that is directly linked with 
distribution is that of TCNO acknowledgment.  Once a process owner receives a TCNO 
through the distribution channels, they are required to formally acknowledge receipt back 
through the distribution chain.  Since this process is so closely related to distribution, it 
appears, through the data gathered from this interview process, to be directly impacted by 
some of the previously mentioned shortfalls of the distribution process as well as have 
some of its own inherent weaknesses.  For example, recall that PMO 5 receives TCNO 
notification from two sources—a parent organizational unit and the TCNO-D website.  
As a result, the interviewee involved in the process must also acknowledge the TCNO to 
both sources, an obvious duplication of effort.   
Applicability Assessment 




PMO Interviewee Results—TCNO Applicability Assessment  
Organization Applicability Assessment Methods  Timeline Allocated to Process 
05 Determined by Software/Operating System loaded Within 24 hours 
10 Determined by Software/Operating System loaded Within 24 hours 
09 Determined by Software/Operating System loaded Within 24 hours 
16 Determined by Software/Operating System loaded Within 24 hours 
NCC Not Applicable (Performed by PMO) - 
NOSC Not Applicable (Performed by PMO) - 
PMO Interviewee Results—TCNO Acknowledgment  
Organization 
Acknowledgment 
Methods  Process Description 
05 Email  Must acknowledge to both parent organizational unit and TCNO dashboard 
10 VMS, TCNO-D 
The security office acknowledges the IAVA through VMS, the testing entity acknowledges the 
TCNO through the TCNO-D 
09 Email, TCNO-D 
PMO testing entity acknowledges receipt through the TCNO-D; the NCC acknowledges receipt 
to the NOSC (see below) before passing the TCNO to the implementation authority 
16 Email, TCNO-D 
PMO testing entity acknowledges receipt through the TCNO-D; the NCC acknowledges receipt 
to the NOSC (see below) before passing the TCNO to the implementation authority 
NCC Action Tracker 
NCC Information Protection office acknowledges receipt of all TCNOs to the NOSC via 
Action tracker 
NOSC Action Tracker NOSC acknowledges receipt to the AFNOSC 
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For all PMOs studied, the process of applicability assessment consists of 
comparing the software applications affected by the TCNO to the software or Operating 
System loaded on the applicable PMO assets.  As a result, the timeframe allocated to this 
process did not vary considerably, with all PMOs completing this step of the process 
within 24 hours.   
Testing 
Table 10: TCNO Testing 
 
 
PMO Interviewee Results—TCNO Testing  




05 Server Login The FSA loads the patch on the operational 


















Minutes to Hours--Testing 
performed immediately after 
TCNO implementation and 
lasts only as long as it takes to 
log in to the server and 
conduct a brief functionality 
check 
Yes 
10 Live testing lab The TCNO is loaded in a live testing 
environment and operationally tested by a group 
of testers 
1 30 days maximum depending 
upon TCNO 
Yes 
09 3 step process The TCNO patch is tested as it is written; it is 
then sent to a lab environment to verify the 
written procedures; it is then sent to a third 
location for a final implementation test 
3 Dependent upon classification 
of the TCNO and complexity 




distributed on the 
designated 
compliance date. 
16 Functionality and 
peer review 
testing 
Since TCNOs for this particular PMO also affect 
third-party controlled assets, the TCNO must be 
tested by this third party prior to implementation.  
Simultaneously, it is sent to a separate test and 
integration office where it undergoes basic 
functionality testing and a peer review process. 
This test and integration office will receive 
notification from the third party testing site once 
it has completed its testing process after which 
the TCNO can be released for implementation. 
2  
(both simultaneous) 
14 days including holidays 
and weekends  
Yes 
NCC Not Applicable 
(Performed by 
PMO) 
- - - - 
NOSC Not Applicable 
(Performed by 
PMO) 




One important aspect to reiterate regarding the data in the above table is that it is 
based upon interviewee response, not verified historical data.  Therefore, whether or not 
an organization frequently meets its own internal testing suspense timelines was not 
verified and instead was recorded based upon on the integrity and knowledge of the 
respondent.  The interviewee from PMO 9 was the only one to convey delays in the 
testing process.  While this interviewee could not specify as to where the delays might 
stem from specifically, based on the data in the table above, it may be due to the number 
of different testing entities involved coupled with the sequential nature of the testing 
process.  Additionally, PMO 9 was also the only organization that could not provide a 
concrete timeline for the testing process.  The interviewee only stated that the testing 
timeline was dependent upon multiple factors including the TCNO classification as well 
as the complexity of the fix action.  The remaining three PMOs each had a definite 
timeframe associated with testing which was not to be exceeded regardless of the TCNO 
classification or fix action involved.  One anomaly exhibited by PMO 5 is the order in 
which testing is performed—that is, after implementation.  Although this PMO has only a 
handful of assets, testing in an operational environment after implementation goes against 
best practice recommendations.  While it may save time, service interruptions realized by 
















A problem that resurfaces in the installation process stems from the distribution 
methods utilized by the PMO TCNO process.  For example, since the functional system 
administrator (FSA) for PMO 9 or PMO 16 cannot install the TCNO fix actions prior to 
receiving authorization from the NOSC and subsequently the NCC to which it reports, 
even if it has received PMO authorization, the timeline is often delayed.  In the case of 
PMO 9, when the PMO releases authorization to load, it provides its own compliance 
suspense for the FSA to meet, which is generally no more than one to two weeks after 
release.  Often, the NOSC authorization to load is released on or after this PMO suspense, 
which results in a failure to meet the compliance deadline before implementation can 
even begin.  The cause for this time lag could not be determined through the interviews 
conducted.    The FSA for PMO 16 as well as the NCC interviewee were both under the 
impression that additional testing was conducted at the NOSC level and this was the 
reason for the delay between PMO authorization to load and NOSC authorization to load.  
PMO Interviewee Results—TCNO Installation  
Organization Automated?  Process Description Internal Timeframe 




05 No Log on to each asset directly, download the patch and load the patch manually No—dictated by TCNO Yes 
10 No Obtain patch from security office; log on to each asset remotely and manually 
load the patch 
45 days Yes 
09 No Log on to PMO website to obtain installation instructions; Log on to a second 
PMO website to download installation file; Log on to each asset remotely and 
run the TCNO installation file 
No—dictated by TCNO Generally meet the 
NOSC deadline but 
miss the PMO 
deadline 
16 No Obtain installation file directly from TCNO email notification; Log on to each 
asset remotely and run the TCNO installation file 
No—dictated by TCNO Yes 
NCC No Some NCC personnel act as PMO FSAs No—dictated by TCNO Yes 






However, when questioned about this, the testing authority from the PMO could not 
explain the lag time, stating that no such testing should occur at the NOSC level since it 
did not have the proper testing environment nor did it have a cause to test more 
extensively than was already being done by the PMO itself.  
This raises another issue—which compliance deadline is authoritative from an 
FSA perspective?  From those interviewed for this research, the only timeline that they 
are held accountable to is that which is imposed by the NOSC and subsequently tracked 
and enforced by the NCC.  Again from an NCC’s perspective, the NOSC directed 
compliance deadline is the one to which they are held accountable.  However, at a higher 
level, the PMO itself is held accountable to meeting its own compliance deadline, which 
is why it makes an effort to test and distribute patches in a timely manner and 
subsequently generates its own compliance deadlines.  
An additional consideration regarding implementation compliance timeframes is 
requesting extensions when necessary. Two of the interviewees did not know what 
procedures to follow if an extension request was necessary, while the rest all had a 
process in place to do so if required.  However, one interviewee from PMO 9 admitted 
that it was not common practice to request extensions even when the compliance deadline 
was known to be missed.  Instead, the organization allowed the status of the TCNO to 
become overdue without action. 
The NOSC also acknowledged the fact that some of its TCNO installations are 
accomplished via automated means, but since this capability has not been instituted at the 














05 Email, Web Report compliance to organizational parent unit and via TCNO-D 
10 Email, VMS The security office reports compliance of the IAVA through VMS; the PMO installation authority reports 
compliance both to the PMO organization and to the security office 
09 Email From a PMO perspective, compliance reporting is synonymous with acknowledgment—once it 
acknowledges via the TCNO-D it considers itself compliant.  From an Air Force perspective, the PMO 
implementation authority reports compliance to the NCC which reports compliance to the NOSC 
16 Action Tracker The PMO implementation authority reports compliance to the NCC which reports compliance to the 
NOSC 
NCC Action Tracker The NCC Information Protection Office reports TCNO compliance to the NOSC via Action Tracker 
NOSC Action Tracker Reports compliance to the AFNOSC 
 
Again, the communications channels of the reporting process practically mirror 
those of the distribution and acknowledgement processes.  One source of conflicting 
opinion amongst a few of the interviewees stemmed from what constituted compliance 
and how compliance was reported.  Perhaps one of the contributors to this confusion is 
the TCNO-D website itself.  The website has a number of display options, one of which 
lists TCNOs in one column and their respective statuses in another, arranged by PMO.  
The status itself is conveyed via a “stoplight chart”, with different colors signifying 
different status levels. Descriptions of each status level as they appear on the TCNO-D 
website are listed in table 13 below: 




TCNO-D Status Levels 
Status Description  
Green Indicates that the TCNO can be Implemented 
Yellow Indicates that the TCNO has been Approved With Provisions 
Blue Indicates the PMO is still analyzing the effects of a TCNO for a specific system 
Orange Indicates the PMO has not stated any status as of yet and has not yet begun analysis 
Grey Indicates the TCNO for this PMO System does not apply and is not to be implemented 






This table illustrates that a “Green” status indicates the TCNO can be 
implemented, not that it has been implemented.  Therefore, the TCNO-D is designed to 
enable TCNO acknowledgment, not compliance reporting.  That being said, two PMOs 
use the website for this very purpose.  The interviewee from PMO 5 uses the TCNO-D to 
acknowledge the TCNO and then waits to change the “Stoplight” status to Green until 
after successful implementation.  At the other end of the spectrum, the interviewee from 
PMO 9 views TCNO acknowledgement and reporting as one in the same.  Following 
testing and approval to implement from the PMO, the interviewee responsible for this 
process changes their respective PMO’s status to Green on the TCNO-D site and at this 
point considers the PMO compliant with the TCNO.  To the contrary, since no 
implementation has taken place at this point in time, the vulnerability has not been 
mitigated.  That being said, the actual compliance (stemming from patch implementation) 
is tracked and recorded through Air Force channels since the assets for this PMO reside 
at a base level.  Consequently, implementation status is reported from the implementation 
authority to the NCC and then to the NOSC and AFNOSC.  These varying views of what 
constitutes compliance could however, cause great disparity in the historical compliance 
records maintained by the PMO and the Air Force.  
 The NCCs and the NOSC utilize two primary tools for compliance reporting--
Action Tracker and Microsoft Systems Management Server (SMS).  Action Tracker is a 
web-based tool that NCCs and NOSCs use to communicate the status of a TCNO.  It uses 
a color-coded “stoplight” status reporting scheme similar to that of the TCNO-D 
discussed previously.  While this tool provides the means to centralize compliance 
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reporting and monitoring, it is also completely manual, requiring technicians at each end 
to update the information on a regular basis.  Both the NCC and the NOSC also use SMS 
which provides automatic TCNO compliance status updates (among other information) 
on a regular basis.  For this process to be effective, each asset must have an SMS client 
loaded so that it can report its status back to a centralized server.  Since these status 
updates are not real-time, there is some lag between the time an asset is patched with a 
TCNO fix action and the time it is reported to SMS.  According to the interviewees at the 
NOSC, SMS is used as a verification tool to compare against the compliance data that are 
manually reported via Action Tracker.   
Enforcing Compliance 
The organizations with the primary responsibility of enforcing compliance are the 
NCC and their parent organization, the NOSC since it is these organizations that have 
oversight of the assets that reside on their respective networks.  The interviewee with the 
responsibility to enforce compliance at the NCC level had both the authority and the 
ability to place noncompliant assets in a “quarantined” state until said assets were 
compliant or had a valid extension approved through the proper channels.  They further 
stated that such quarantine actions have been taken in the past when deemed necessary 
and have proved effective.  On the other hand, while two of the NOSC interviewees 
acknowledged the organization has both the authority and the ability to enforce 
compliance by removing any noncompliant asset from the network, to their knowledge, 




Accurate system inventory 
When it came to controlling system accountability, each PMO maintained an 
inventory of which assets it controlled and where they were dispersed.  In addition, the 
interviewee at the NCC knew how many assets it monitored and maintained a list of each 
PMO that resided at its location.  The NOSC on the other hand, did not maintain such 
information.  While it could provide a count of the systems it monitored via SMS, the 
interviewee responsible for NOSC TCNO compliance reporting could not provide a list 
of PMOs that reside on the NOSCs distributed network and for which TCNO compliance 
was mandated.  The interviewee stated that the only way to determine such information 
would be to call each of the individual bases to collect the data.    
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Overview 
This chapter is intended to answer the research questions, sub-questions and 
propositions developed and outlined in Chapters I and II by presenting the researcher’s 
conclusions based on the results discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter is then 
concluded with limitations of the research as well as recommendations for future 
research. 
Answers to Research Questions 
RQ1).  How does the lack of standardized, centrally managed, and enforced TCNO 
patching procedures for PMO impact the TCNO compliance timeframe and in turn, 
the security posture of the Air Force Network? 
Each organization studied has implemented its own TCNO processes and methods 
of execution—some appear to work well, while others have significant negative impact 
on the TCNO compliance timeframe.  Having a standardized, centrally managed and 
enforced TCNO patching process could exploit those methods that work well and enable 
all organizations to benefit from them.  This is not to say that every TCNO process 
should be centrally controlled nor every method of TCNO process execution 
micromanaged.  For example, forcing specific methods of testing on each PMO may 
beyond the scope of Air Force authority and such action would likely provide little 
process improvement; however, requiring minimum standards and enforcing timelines is 
essential to ensuring timely TCNO compliance.  On the other hand, some TCNO 
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processes may benefit greatly from centralized control.  For example instituting a 
standardized means of distribution, acknowledgment, reporting, monitoring, and overall 
means of communication could greatly decrease the amount of unnecessary work, 
streamline the TCNO process and significantly reduce the overall TCNO compliance 
timeline.  To adequately do so requires centralized oversight and an awareness of the 
PMO asset landscape, which was not apparent during the course of this research.  Each 
organization involved appears to only have a localized viewpoint of the TCNO processes 
and associated responsibilities.  Also, not all processes appeared to have significant 
impact on the TCNO compliance timeframe.  This is further illustrated by the results 
discussed in Chapter IV as well as the answers to the sub-research questions that appear 
below.  
 
SRQ1). How do the methods of TCNO distribution (both to and from the PMOs) 
impact the TCNO compliance timeframe?  
Amongst the four PMOs studied, no two distribution processes were identical, nor 
was there any distribution process without some imperfections.  Each of the four 
organizations studied had at least one organization that was directly involved in the 
distribution process unnecessarily causing duplicate TCNO notifications, which again 
resulted in the requirement of redundant acknowledgment and compliance reporting.    
What set the high-performing PMOs apart from the low-performing PMOs was the fact 
that in the case of former, the overall implementation process did not rely on these 
extraneous organizations for TCNO implementation.  In other words, in the instances 
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where there were multiple distribution channels, regardless of which source the TCNO 
was received, the next step in the process could occur immediately. Effectively, although 
there might have been multiple channels feeding it, the distribution process upon which 
the PMO relied to implement a TCNO for highest-performing organizations occurred as a 
single, logical process flow.  On the other hand, the distribution process for low-
performing organizations branches off and includes other Air Force organizational units, 
thereby adding additional steps in the process.  For an illustration, refer to figure 3, a 
modification of the TCNO distribution process as outlined in AFI 33-138.  In the case of 
the highest-performing PMOs, the process follows the dotted-line, where the PMO (or 
PMO designated organizational unit) distributes the PMO directly to the parties 
responsible for each of the subsequent steps (applicability assessment, testing, etc) and 
finally to the individual responsible for implementation.  In the case of the low-
performing PMOs, the process followed this same progression; however, there was a 
secondary process that occurred in tandem in which the PMO distributed its TCNO 
information to the NOSC which then distributed it to the NCC which then distributed it to 
the implementation authority.  Although this secondary distribution process always took 









Figure 3: Apparent TCNO distribution process 
 
Since the distribution process dictates not only how the organizational units 
involved in the TCNO process receives the TCNO information and fix actions but also 
how acknowledgment, compliance reporting and all other communications are 
conducted, adding additional steps to this process unnecessarily can have a profound 
effect on the compliance timeframe.  
 The other issue that warrants attention is the methods used for this process.  While 
all organizations used email as a means of distribution, it was the way in which these 
emails were generated differed (ie automated vs. manual).  The distribution method that 
appeared to work the best amongst those PMOs studied was the use of the TCNO 
dashboard (TCNO-D).  This web-based system sent an automated email to all necessary 
process owners when a TCNO was listed on the website.  It also provided a centralized 
means of acknowledgment and progress monitoring.  Although both of the low-
70 
 
performing PMOs utilized the TCNO-D for initial TCNO distribution and 
acknowledgment, the secondary distribution channel addressed earlier instituted 
additional distribution methods, none of which had the ability to interface with the 
TCNO-D and all of which were manually driven.   
Again, the method of distribution tended to dictate all further lines of 
communication including TCNO acknowledgement and compliance reporting.  Adding 
additional, stove-piped or manual methods appeared to further complicate these processes 
and as a result, lengthen the overall compliance timeline.   
The distribution process must be streamlined so that only those organizations with 
a legitimate reason are involved in the TCNO distribution process.  While it may be 
beneficial to provide some of these extraneous organizations the ability to monitor TCNO 
progress, making this oversight an additional, sequential (as opposed to concurrent) step 
in the distribution process does not add any value to the process and instead inhibits the 
timely implementation of the TCNO.  In addition, there should be a single distribution 
method that utilizes automation as much as possible.  This not only eliminates redundant 
processes and provides a single source of reference for process owners, but also reduces 
workload by reducing manual data entry. 
 
SRQ2).  How do PMO applicability assessment methods impact the TCNO compliance 
timeframe? 
It does not appear that the applicability assessment process impacts the TCNO 
compliance timeframe a great deal as the process itself was straightforward and did not 
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vary considerably amongst the PMO organizations.  In addition, for each of the PMOs 
studied, this process took minimal time and resources.  The key to successfully assessing 
the applicability of a TCNO in a timely manner is an awareness of exactly what software 
is present on all applicable systems, which each PMO appeared to have.   
 
SRQ3).  How do PMO testing methods impact the TCNO compliance timeframe? 
The testing process tended to vary considerably between the PMO organizations, 
with no apparent connection between the methods used and the compliance timeframe 
itself.   
Recall from Chapter II that an ideal testing environment should “mimic the 
production environment as close as possible” (Voldal, 2003) and a successful testing 
process should ensure the patch: “corrects the vulnerability, does not open an old 
vulnerability, does not introduce a new vulnerability, does not degrade system 
performance and is compatible with all other required applications” (Grigg & Oleksak, 
2004).  PMO 10, one of the highest-performing organizations, satisfied both of these 
criteria by utilizing a live testing environment to mimic an operational environment.  In 
addition, the distribution channels involved in this process were simplified by testing in 
one physical location and there was a definitive timeline associated with each TCNO 
testing period.  On the other hand, PMO 9 utilized a three-step process with three 
separate physical locations, which introduced multiple lines of communication.  There 
was also no apparent timeline that could be assigned with this process.  The PMO with 
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the best testing timeline had it by default, since it performed no testing prior to TCNO 
implementation.  
 It appears, aside from not testing at all, a practice certainly not recommended by 
any professional literature reviewed for this study, implementing a thorough testing 
process in one physical location that mimics the production environment as closely as 
possible and follows a clear, enforced timeline has the least negative impact to the overall 
TCNO process.  Again, while requiring all PMO organizations to follow the exact same 
testing procedures may be impractical, certain standards and oversight should apply to 
this process to reduce delays 
 
SRQ4).  How do PMO patching methods impact the TCNO compliance timeframe? 
For all PMOs studied, a common weakness in the TCNO process was the fact that 
all patching is done manually.   That being said, for many PMO organizations, a manual 
patching process was not implemented out of preference.  In fact, an interviewee from 
PMO 9 expressed an organizational goal to develop or utilize an automated patching 
process such as SMS, but stated a lack of resources and manpower needed for the 
development of such a capability as the reason it has not come to fruition as of yet.  The 
NOSC also expressed a desire for automated patching methods for all PMOs.  One 
NOSC interviewee stated the lack of an automated means of patching PMO machines as 
a direct weakness to network security due to the additional time added to the patching 
process.  Inherent in a manual patching process is an extended timeframe for 
implementation due to the work involved, the lack of centralized control and the obvious 
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limitations imposed by the number of patches one individual can install at any given 
time.  On the other hand, automated tools such as SMS can install TCNO patches on 
thousands of machines simultaneously and “re-advertise” the installation of these patches 
on 24 hour timeline for any machines for which installation was not initially successful.   
Interestingly, much of the lag time associated with TCNO patching stemmed not 
solely from the patching methods used but also from the point at which the 
implementation authority (ie FSA) was authorized to load the patch.  Once again this 
goes back to the original means of distribution and the communication channels used in 
the overall TCNO process.   
While it may not be possible to automate patching in the sense that all PMOs use 
the exact same method or tool, some form of automation should be a priority or even a 
requirement for each PMO that resides on the Air Force Network.  That way, when a 
patch is authorized to load, installation can be centrally managed and performed in timely 
manner.  In addition, there should be one and only one authority to approve 
implementation.  FSAs for PMOs 9 and 16 expressed frustration with the fact that 
although the PMO authorized installation of the patch, they were not authorized to do so 
until after the NOSC released its own authorization, even though it appears there is no 
value added to the process (such as necessary additional testing) by the NOSC.  Having 






SRQ5).  How do PMO reporting methods impact the TCNO compliance timeframe? 
Again, at the risk of being repetitive, the communications channels initially 
established by the distribution process also dictate the reporting channels and due to 
weaknesses already identified, there is much redundancy and a number of unnecessary 
steps involved in this process.  This extends the TCNO compliance timeframe 
unnecessarily.   
Compliance reporting (whether PMO or not), to a large degree, is done via 
manual means.  This is supplemented to some extend by an automated tool (SMS), but 
the authoritative reporting data is manually entered into a web-based system which takes 
time and like any manual means, is subject to human error.   
Also, as identified in Chapter IV, there was some confusion as to what constituted 
compliance reporting.  Some organizations felt that acknowledgment of receipt was 
synonymous with compliance even though no patching had actually occurred. Although 
the TCNO-D is used by many PMOs, it does include the ability to report compliance 
statistics, a significant weakness.   
Since all PMO assets on the NOSC controlled network are required to have SMS 
clients loaded as a means of observation, there appears to be little reason why compliance 
reporting cannot be done via automated means.  In fact, interviewees at the NOSC 
expressed a desire to have TCNO compliance data for all machines on the network 




SRQ6).  Are there any additional organizational behavior issues that might impact the 
TCNO compliance timeframe? 
This research question was designed to highlight any additional organizational 
behavior issues that might be identified through the research process that would suggest 
an impact on the TCNO compliance timeframe.  One of the issues identified was the 
organizational willingness to enforce TCNO compliance.  In the case of the NCC, the 
approval authority had in fact enforced compliance by removing non-compliant PMO 
assets from operation.  The NOSC, on the other hand, expressed a reluctance to take such 
action, even though they had the authority and ability.  This goes beyond the TCNO 
process itself and instead points to a potential cultural impact on the compliance 
timeframe.   
Answers to Propositions 
Proposition 1: High-performing organizations have an accurate system inventory 
This proposition proved accurate to a degree.  All PMO organizations appeared to 
have an accurate picture of where their respective assets resided.  Therefore, both well- 
and low-performing PMOs appeared to have accurate system inventories.  However, the 
NOSC did not have a list of PMO assets that reside at each individual base under its 
control.  While this did not have a direct impact on the four PMO TCNO compliance 
timeframes studied for this research effort, it is certainly a factor that could impact other 
PMO compliance timeframes.  For example, during the interview process an NCC 
interviewee reported an additional 8 PMOs that existed at the base level that the NOSC 
was not aware of.  While the NOSC may not (and possibly should not) be directly 
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involved in the TCNO patching process for those PMOs, a failure to maintain an accurate 
system inventory results in a failure to maintain awareness of  resulting network 
vulnerabilities.   
 
Proposition 2: Despite a possible similarity in TCNO compliance results, due to the 
lack of standardized TCNO processes, the methods of process execution will vary 
amongst all PMO organizations studied.   
This proposition proved to be accurate as outlined in the results section of Chapter 
IV and further highlighted above in the answers to the research questions.  No two 
organizations had exactly the same TCNO processes. 
 
Proposition 3: There will be noticeable difference in the TCNO processes (or the 
execution of those processes) of high-performing and low-performing PMO 
organizations 
The proposition also proved to be accurate.  Perhaps the overwhelming difference 
between well and low-performing organizations was the communications channels used 
for the execution of the TCNO processes.  This appeared to have much to do with how 
dispersed the PMO organizations were and as a result, which organizations they had to 
interact with.  Therefore, other similarities in organizational characteristics may 
contribute to process execution such as geographic disbursement of assets and 




The results of this study may not be generalized across the entire Air Force.  The 
four PMOs studied cannot account for all processes and methods of execution used by 
every PMO across the Air Force.  In the case of identifying best practices, there may be 
organizations that have implemented procedures that would greatly benefit the 
development of a standardized Air Force TCNO process for PMOs.   While the historical 
data used for site selection was analyzed largely by automated means, there was some 
degree of manual data input on the part of the researcher.  Therefore there is the 
possibility of an incorrect or erroneous entry.  That being said, since site selection was 
based upon several factors and five years of historical data a small number of input errors 
should have little impact on the end result.  This historical data was also originally 
gathered via a system (Action Tracker) that relies on manual data entry.  Therefore, 
human error may have been introduced at this point as well.  Since no direct observation 
was used in this study, aside from site selection the results were based upon interviewee 
self-reporting.  The interview process and resulting data analysis may be impacted by 
research bias since both were conducted by the same individual. 
Recommendations for Action and Future Research  
One thing this research identified was that the PMO TCNO process (as well as the 
overall Air Force TCNO process) needs one, centralized means for communication.  This 
includes TCNO distribution, acknowledgement, reporting and monitoring.  Having 
disparate, disconnected systems operating at multiple levels provides limited oversight of 
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the overall security posture of the Air Force network and negatively impacts the TCNO 
compliance timeframe.  Also, the extent of manual work involved in the existing systems 
also impacted the compliance timeframe and potentially influenced compliance data.  
Perhaps the largest obstacle encountered during initial data collection for site selection 
was the lack of standardization in the data itself.  Often a PMO’s name would appear in 
the database under several different name variations.  One PMO had over 40 different 
variations of its name appear in the database.  This makes it very difficult to accurately 
capture historical data for a given organization without running the risk of omitting 
potentially important data.  A great deal of information would need to be gathered from 
all entities involved including PMOs and impacted Air Force organizations in order to 
develop a solution to these problems.  Further research should be conducted to either 
develop a new system that would correct existing problems or further develop an existing 
system such as the TCNO-D so that it might meet all of these needs.    
There are likely additional organizational factors both physical and behavioral 
that influence the TCNO process.  Factors such as organizational size or levels of 
autonomy provided to those involved in the process could impact the overall TCNO 
compliance timeframe.  Size in particular was a factor common to like-performing 
organizations, with the two low-performing organizations being amongst the largest and 
the two best-performing organizations being amongst the smallest.  Although, the two 
lowest-performing organizations utilized almost the exact same communications channels 
for the majority of their processes, which appeared to be a major inhibiting factor, size 
may well have an impact of its own.  It seems likely that the fewer assets an organization 
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has, the easier it should be to manage them.  Further research could examine how 
organizational size impacts the TCNO process and if it is indeed an obstacle, how to 
overcome it.  Also research could be conducted to examine a PMO organization, possible 
through direct observation, to determine what, if any, organizational behavior issues 
impact the TCNO process and to what degree.  
Conclusion 
This research was intended to examine the existing TCNO processes used by 
PMOs and interacting Air Force agencies to identify potential shortfalls and ultimately 
provide recommendations for improvement in an effort to move towards a standardized 
TCNO patching process.  It is evident that there is currently no means of quickly and 
accurately identifying all PMOs or PMO assets that reside on the Air Force Network, a 
problem that requires attention in order to truly understand the existing vulnerabilities to 
this network’s security posture.   
By interviewing those involved in these processes, it is also apparent that there are 
no standardized methods of execution for TCNO processes used by PMO organizations 
and that these processes would likely benefit from a standardized, centrally managed and 
enforced approach.  While not all TCNO procedures appear to impact the TCNO 
compliance timeframe equally, there are some that deserve greater attention.  
Specifically, a standardized means of distribution, acknowledgment, reporting, 
monitoring, and overall means of communication could greatly decrease the amount of 
unnecessary work, streamline the TCNO process, and significantly reduce the overall 
TCNO compliance timeline.   
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Appendix A: Case Study Protocol and Case Study Database Format 
Overview of the Case Study 
Background 
Network security is a paramount concern for organizations utilizing computer 
technology, and the Air Force is no exception.  The Air Force deploys network security 
patches as Time Compliance Network Orders (TCNOs), which together with associated 
processes and enforced timelines ensure network compliance.  The current AF method to 
track and manage the TCNO process amongst its many PMOs is extremely limited and 
fragmented at best.  There is no current or planned, standardized method to release 
TCNOs to PMOs within the AF.  In order to improve existing PMO patch management 
methods, we must examine the entire process including patch distribution, assessment, 
testing, patching and reporting practices used by PMOs operating within the bounds of 
the Air Force network.  Consequently, this study will examine how the lack of 
standardized, centrally managed, and enforced TCNO patching procedures for PMO 




• The Air Force Regulation that governs the TCNO process is AFI 33-138  
• Pending Air Force Guidance: Vulnerability Lifecycle Management System 
(VLMS) Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
• Previous Air Force thesis research: Kubinsky (2004) Securing the Air Force 





This research is being sponsored by 8th AF, DET 1/AFNOSC. 
 
Contact:  Capt Mario Oliver 
  Assistant Director of Operations 







To set up an interview 
 
Start with an email (see format below) to establish contact and explain the purpose of the 




My name is Lt Mike Czumak.  I am a student at the Air Force Institute of Technology conducting research 
regarding Air Force Time Compliance Network Orders (TCNOs).  Specifically, the goal of 
this research is to gain a better understanding of how Project Management Offices with assets operating on 
the Air Force Network perform the TCNO process and from this understanding, develop potential 
recommendations for standardized processes, process improvements and identify any best practices. 
 
I understand you are involved with this process for your organization and I would like to conduct an 
interview to gather data for my research.  Please contact me at michael.czumak@afit.edu if you are able to 
participate and we can set up a time convenient for you.  
 
If you have any questions, please don’t hesitate to contact me.  I have also included my thesis advisor’s 
contact information below: 
 





Michael Czumak III, 1Lt, USAF 
Student, Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) 
School of Engineering and Management (ENV) 




Immediately prior to the interview: 
• Review pertinent information 
• Ensure to have the following information readily available: 
o Air Force Regulations governing TCNOs 
o Any correspondence previously made with the interviewee 
o List of Questions/Question Answer Sheet  
o Laptop for recording answers 




At the start of the interview: 
1. Researcher Introduction: “My name is Lt Mike Czumak.  I am a student at the Air 
Force Institute of Technology conducting Air Force (8AF/AFNOSC) sponsored 
research regarding Air Force Time Compliance Network Orders (TCNOs).”   
 
2. Read the purpose statement: “The goal of this research is to gain a better 
understanding of how Project Management Offices with assets operating on the 
Air Force Network perform the TCNO process and from this understanding, 
develop potential recommendations for standardized processes, process 
improvements and identify any best practices.”  
 
3. Describe the interview process: “This will be a semi-structured interview.  I have 
a short list of questions, which may lead to additional questions for further 
research or clarification purposes.  Please feel free to interject any information 
you feel may be useful to the research.”   
 
4. Assure anonymity: “I want to remind you that no identifying information obtained 
through this or subsequent interviews will be retained or reported in the final 
research report. In order to complete the research effort, data collected on 
individual subjects may include general duty description of/duration in current 
position, but no names (of interviewee or organization) or position identifiers will 
be retained. Data gathering will be focused on information specific to Air Force 
and PMO TCNO procedures.”  
 
5. Record interviewee information and interview start time on record sheet 
  
















Following the Interview: 
• Record interview stop time on record sheet 
 
• Consolidate all information into Case Study Database (see attached) 
 
• Follow up with an email which should contain the following elements (see template 
below): 
o Short message thanking the participant for their time 
o Request for any outstanding information necessary for completing the report 
o Full contact information of researcher and thesis advisor 





Thank you for participating in the [telephone] interview conducted on [date].  The 
information you provided will certainly contribute to my research efforts.   
 
As discussed, I would appreciate your assistance in obtaining the following documents: 
[As applicable] 
 
Also, as discussed, I owe you the following information/deliverables:  [As applicable] 
 
In addition, you will receive a copy of the draft thesis for your review prior to publishing.   
 




Michael Czumak III, 1Lt, USAF 
Student, Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) 
School of Engineering and Management (ENV) 




A Guide for the Study Report  
 
The final case study report will be written in the approved Air Force Institute of 
Technology thesis format.   
 
Attachments: 
1) Case Study Questions 
2) Case Study Database Format 
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Case Study Questions 
 
The interviews of this case study are designed to be semi-structured.  The questions listed 
below are tailored to the intended interviewee.  These questions are meant to provide a 
direction, focus and general flow of the interview; however, other lines of questioning are 
likely to develop based on interviewee responses.  For interview data collection, copy the 
appropriate questions onto designated section of the Interview Data Collection Sheet, 
which appears later in this Attachment following the Case Study Database Format.  Each 
interview will have its own Interview Data Collection Sheet.  Any additional questions 
that may come up during the interview and their respective answers must also be 
recorded in the same manner.   
 
Although the majority of interviews conducted in this research study are intended to be 
conducted via telephone and with the answers recorded by the researcher, the questions 
listed below are presented in a format that allows for them to be sent and responded to via 
email should the need arise.  If this is the case, an introduction and directions are 
provided at the end of this section to be included with the questions.    
 
 
Project Management Office Interview Outline 
SECTION 1: INTERVIEWEE INFO 
Question 1: Please provide your general job description (please do not include a specific 
duty title or position identifier): 
Answer: Please write your answer in this space 
Question 2: Please describe your role in your PMO’s TCNO process.  
Answer:  
Question 3: How long have you been working with the Air Force TCNO process? 
(Years/Months):  
Answer:  
Question 4: How many assets are you personally responsible for ensuring TCNO 
compliance? 
Answer:  
Question 5: Are you familiar the Air Force TCNO-D (Dashboard) website? Do you utilize 
it? 
Answer:  
Question 6: Are you familiar with the Air Force regulation governing TCNO procedures? 
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 6a.  
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    If you answered “No”, please proceed to Section 2: Organizational/PMO Info. 
Question 6a: To what capacity, if any does your PMO use the regulation in its TCNO 
processes? 
Answer:  
SECTION 2: ORGANIZATIONAL/PMO INFO 
Question 1: What function do your PMO assets (that reside on the Air Force network) 
perform? 
Answer:  
Question 2:  How many assets does your PMO currently have operating on the Air Force 
network? Has this number changed significantly in the past 5 years? 
Answer:  
Question 3: How many people are assigned to the Air Force TCNO process in your PMO? 
Answer:  
Question 4: Do you maintain other assets besides those that reside on the Air Force 
network? 
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 4a.   
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to Section 3: Organizational/PMO Procedures. 
Question 4a: Is the security patching of these assets managed by separate guidance? 
Answer:  
Question 4b: Do you feel that guidance is more or less effective? Why? 
Answer:  
SECTION 3: ORGANIZATIONAL/PMO PROCEDURES 
Question 1: Does your PMO have written policies/procedures regarding TCNO compliance 
for your assets that reside on the Air Force network? 
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 1a.   
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to the Question 2. 
Question 1a: Do these policies/procedures differ in any way from the security patching 





Question 1b: When were these policies/procedures created? 
Answer:  
Question 1c: When were these policies/procedures last updated? 
Answer:  
Question 1d: By whom are these policies/procedures maintained? 
Answer:  
Question 2: Do you have established written procedures for the following five situations?        
(Please write ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ in the provided spaces) 
The TCNO does not apply to the program   
The TCNO applies to the program and the FSAs are 
authorized to implement the countermeasure according to 
the procedures contained in the TCNO. 
 
The TCNO applies to the program but the FSAs are not 
authorized to implement the countermeasure according to 
the procedures contained in the TCNO. 
 
The TCNO applies to the program but actual 
implementation procedures are not yet available.  
 
Answer: 
The applicability of the TCNO to the program is not 
known at this time. 
 
Question 3: How (email, hard copy, website) and from whom do you receive notice of Air 
Force TCNOs?  
Answer:  
Question 4: Are you responsible for TCNO acknowledgment? 
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 4a.  
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to the Question 4d. 
Question 4a: Is this process dictated by established written guidance? If not, please describe 
the process in as much detail as possible. 
Answer:  
Question 4b: Is this process followed for every TCNO? 
Answer:  




Question 4d (only 
answer if you 
answered “No” 
to question 4): 
Who is responsible for this process? Can you provide their contact information? 
Answer:  
Question 5: Are you responsible for determining TCNO applicability on your systems? 
(Applicability indicates whether the TCNO will be installed on at least one of 
your PMO systems residing on the Air Force Network)   
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 5a.  
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to the Question 5d. 
Question 5a: Is this process dictated by established written guidance? If not, please describe 
the process in as much detail as possible. 
Answer:  
Question 5b: Is this process followed for every TCNO? 
Answer:  
Question 5c: What is the timeframe allocated to this process? 
Answer:  
Question 5d (only 
answer if you 
answered “No” 
to question 5): 
Who is responsible for this process? Can you provide their contact information? 
Answer:  
Question 6: Are you responsible for TCNO testing on your systems?   
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 5a.   
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to the Question 5e. 
Question 6a: Is this process dictated by established written guidance? If not, please describe 
the process in as much detail as possible. 
Answer:  




Question 6c: What is the timeframe allocated to this process? 
Answer:  
Question 6d: Is this process conducted in one location/facility? 
Answer:  
Question 6e (only 
answer if you 
answered “No” 
to question 6): 
Who is responsible for this process? Can you provide their contact information? 
Answer:  
Question 7: Are you responsible for TCNO installation on your systems?  
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 7a.   
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to the Question 7d. 
Question 7a: Is this process dictated by established written guidance? If not, please describe 
the process in as much detail as possible. 
Answer:  
Question 7b: Is this process followed for every TCNO? 
Answer:  
Question 7c: What is the timeframe allocated to this process? 
Answer:  
Question 7d (only 
answer if you 
answered “No” 
to question 7): 
Who is responsible for the installation process (ie. base level FSAs, another 
organization, etc.)?  May I have their contact information? 
Answer:  
Question 8: Are you responsible for reporting TCNO compliance?   
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 8a.   
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to the Question 8e. 
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Question 8a: Is this process dictated by established written guidance? If not, please describe 
the process in as much detail as possible. 
Answer:  
Question 8b: Is this process followed for every TCNO?  If not, list any exceptions. 
Answer:  
Question 8c: What is the timeframe allocated to this process? 
Answer:  
Question 8e (only 
answer if you 
answered “No” 
to question 7): 
Who is responsible for the reporting process (ie. base level FSAs, another 
organization, etc.)?  May I have their contact information? 
Answer:  
Question 9: Do you maintain historical records of your TCNO compliance? 
Answer:  
Question 10: Is there an overall set timeline/deadline allocated to the TCNO process for your 
PMO? Is this timeline frequently met?  If not, how much would you say it is 
exceeded on average? 
Answer:  
Question 10a: By whom and how is this timeline determined? 
Answer:  
Question 10b: Is this timeline frequently met?  If not, how much would you say it is exceeded 
on average? 
Answer:  
Question 11: What procedures do you follow if you require an extension for a given TCNO? 
Answer:  
Question 11a: Is this process dictated by established written guidance? If not, please describe 
the process in as much detail as possible. 
Answer:  
Question 12: Are there any other organizations you interface with to ensure TCNO 




Question 13: Do you utilize any automated methods in your TCNO patching process?  If not, 
are there any procedure you would like to see automated (please explain)? 
Answer:  
Question 14: Are there any methods of TCNO process management (to include any processes 
used to ensure TCNO compliance) used within your PMO that you feel work 
particularly well? 
Answer:  
Question 15: Do you have any general comments or recommendations for improvement to 
the overall TCNO patching/management process? 
Answer:  
Question 16:  May I receive an electronic copy of any TCNO written procedures your PMO 
maintains?  (If so, please attach it to your email response.)  If you do not 
maintain any written guidance, is there an individual I may speak with to better 



























MAJCOM NOSC Interview Outline (MAJCOM PMO-Specific Contacts) 
SECTION 1: INTERVIEWEE INFO 
Question 1: Please provide your general job description (please do not include a specific 
duty title or position identifier): 
Answer: Please write your answer in this space 
Question 2: Please describe your role in your PMO’s TCNO process.  
Answer:  
Question 3: How long have you been working with the Air Force TCNO process? 
(Years/Months):  
Answer:  
Question 4: How many assets are you personally responsible for ensuring TCNO 
compliance? 
Answer:  
Question 5: Are you familiar the Air Force TCNO-D (Dashboard) website? Do you utilize 
it? 
Answer:  
Question 6: Are you familiar with the Air Force regulation governing TCNO procedures? 
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 6a.  
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to Section 2: Organizational/PMO Info. 
Question 6a: To what capacity, if any does your PMO use the regulation in its TCNO 
processes? 
Answer:  
SECTION 2: ORGANIZATIONAL/PMO INFO 
Question 1: What function do your PMO assets (that reside on the Air Force network) 
perform? 
Answer:  
Question 2:  How many assets does your PMO currently have operating on the Air Force 
network within your MAJCOM? Has this number changed significantly in the 
past 5 years? 
Answer:  





Question 4: Do you maintain other assets besides those that reside on the Air Force 
network? 
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 4a.   
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to Section 3: Organizational/PMO Procedures. 
Question 4a: Is the security patching of these assets managed by separate guidance? 
Answer:  
Question 4b: Do you feel that guidance is more or less effective? Why? 
Answer:  
SECTION 3: ORGANIZATIONAL/PMO PROCEDURES 
Question 1: Does the PMO have written policies/procedures regarding TCNO compliance 
for your assets that reside on the Air Force network? 
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 1a.   
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to the Question 2. 
Question 1a: Do these policies/procedures differ in any way from the security patching 
procedures that apply to other PMO assets not residing on the AF network (if 
applicable)? 
Answer:  
Question 1b: When were these policies/procedures created? 
Answer:  
Question 1c: When were these policies/procedures last updated? 
Answer:  
Question 1d: By whom are these policies/procedures maintained? 
Answer:  
Question 2: Do you have established written procedures for the following five situations?        
(Please write ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ in the provided spaces) 
Answer: The TCNO does not apply to the program   
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The TCNO applies to the program and the FSAs are 
authorized to implement the countermeasure according to 
the procedures contained in the TCNO. 
 
The TCNO applies to the program but the FSAs are not 
authorized to implement the countermeasure according to 
the procedures contained in the TCNO. 
 
The TCNO applies to the program but actual 
implementation procedures are not yet available.  
 
The applicability of the TCNO to the program is not 
known at this time. 
 
Question 3: How (email, hard copy, website) and from whom do you receive notice of Air 
Force TCNOs?  
Answer:  
Question 4: Are you responsible for TCNO acknowledgment? 
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 4a.  
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to the Question 4d. 
Question 4a: Is this process dictated by established written guidance? If not, please describe 
the process in as much detail as possible. 
Answer:  
Question 4b: Is this process followed for every TCNO? 
Answer:  
Question 4c: What is the timeframe allocated to this process? 
Answer:  
Question 4d (only 
answer if you 
answered “No” 
to question 4):: 
Who is responsible for this process? Can you provide their contact information? 
Answer:  
Question 5: Do you determine TCNO applicability on your systems or is this done by 
another entity? (Applicability indicates whether the TCNO will be installed on 




**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 5a.  
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to the Question 6. 
Question 5a: Is this process dictated by established written guidance? If not, please describe 
the process in as much detail as possible. 
Answer:  
Question 5b: Is this process followed for every TCNO? 
Answer:  
Question 5c: What is the timeframe allocated to this process? 
Answer:  
Question 6: Do you perform TCNO testing on your systems or is this performed by another 
entity?   
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 6a.   
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to the Question 7. 
Question 6a: Is this process dictated by established written guidance? If not, please describe 
the process in as much detail as possible. 
Answer:  
Question 6b: Is this process followed for every TCNO? 
Answer:  
Question 6c: What is the timeframe allocated to this process? 
Answer:  
Question 6d: Is this process conducted in one location/facility? 
Answer:  
Question 7: Are you responsible for TCNO installation on your systems?  
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 7a.   
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to the Question 7d. 
Question 7a: Is this process dictated by established written guidance? If not, please describe 




Question 7b: Is this process followed for every TCNO? 
Answer:  
Question 7c: What is the timeframe allocated to this process? 
Answer:  
Question 7d (only 
answer if you 
answered “No” 
to question 6): 
Who is responsible for the installation process (ie. base level FSAs, another 
organization, etc.)?  May I have their contact information? 
Answer:  
Question 8: Are you responsible for reporting TCNO compliance?   
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 8a.   
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to the Question 8e. 
Question 8a: Is this process dictated by established written guidance? If not, please describe 
the process in as much detail as possible. 
Answer:  
Question 8b: Is this process followed for every TCNO?  If not, list any exceptions. 
Answer:  
Question 8c: What is the timeframe allocated to this process? 
Answer:  
Question 8e (only 
answer if you 
answered “No” 
to question 7): 
Who is responsible for the reporting process (ie. base level FSAs, another 
organization, etc.)?  May I have their contact information? 
Answer:  
Question 9: Do you maintain historical records of your TCNO compliance? 
Answer:  
Question 10: Is there an overall set timeline/deadline allocated to the TCNO process for your 
PMO? Is this timeline frequently met?  If not, how much would you say it is 




Question 10a: By whom and how is this timeline determined? 
Answer:  
Question 10b: Is this timeline frequently met?  If not, how much would you say it is exceeded 
on average? 
Answer:  
Question 11: What procedures do you follow if you require an extension for a given TCNO? 
Answer:  
Question 11a: Is this process dictated by established written guidance? If not, please describe 
the process in as much detail as possible. 
Answer:  
Question 12: Are there any other organizations you interface with to ensure TCNO 
compliance? (Please list) 
Answer:  
Question 13: Do you utilize any automated methods in your TCNO patching process?  If not, 
are there any procedure you would like to see automated (please explain)? 
Answer:  
Question 14: Are there any methods of TCNO process management (to include any processes 
used to ensure TCNO compliance) used within your PMO that you feel work 
particularly well? 
Answer:  
Question 15: Do you have any general comments or recommendations for improvement to 
the overall TCNO patching/management process? 
Answer:  
Question 16:  May I receive an electronic copy of any TCNO written procedures your PMO 
maintains?  (If so, please attach it to your email response.)  If you do not 
maintain any written guidance, is there an individual I may speak with to better 







MAJCOM CONTACTS RESPOSIBLE FOR GENERAL TCNO PROCEDURES 
SECTION 1: INTERVIEWEE INFO 
Question 1: Please provide your general job description (please do not include a specific 
duty title or position identifier): 
Please write your answer in this space Answer: 
Question 2: Please describe your role in your MAJCOM’s TCNO process.  
Answer:  
Question 3: How long have you been working with the Air Force TCNO process? 
(Years/Months):  
Answer:  
Question 4: How many assets are you personally responsible for ensuring TCNO 
compliance? 
Answer:  
Question 5: Are you familiar the Air Force TCNO-D (Dashboard) website? Do you utilize 
it? 
Answer:  
Question 6: Are you familiar with the Air Force regulation governing TCNO procedures? 
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 6a.  
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to Section 2: PMO Asset Info. 
Question 6a: To what capacity, if any does your PMO use the regulation in its TCNO 
processes? 
Answer:  
SECTION 2: PMO ASSET INFO 
Question 1: How many PMOs reside in the MAJCOM? 
Answer:  
Question 2:  How many PMO assets reside in the MAJCOM? 
Answer:  
Question 3: How many of these PMOs/assets reside at the MAJCOM level (report directly 
to the MAJCOM NOSC)? 
Answer:  
Question 4: How many of these PMOs/assets reside at the base NCC level (report directly to 




SECTION 3: ORGANIZATIONAL PROCEDURES 
Question 1: What guidance do you follow that dictates the TCNO process for your 
MAJCOM? 
Answer:  
Question 2: Is there an established method for identifying all PMO machines in your 
MAJCOM? 
Answer:  
Question 3: Do you have the ability to scan/remotely monitor PMO machines for security 
vulnerabilities? 
Answer:  
Question 4: How and from whom do you receive notice that a TCNO is due for a PMO 
asset?   
Answer:  
Question 5: How do you communicate with FSAs responsible for PMO assets under your 
area of responsibility? 
Answer:  
Question 6: Does anyone at the MAJCOM level act as an FSA for any PMO assets? 
Answer:  
Question 7: How are you notified of TCNO compliance? 
Answer:  
Question 8: Are you responsible for reporting PMO TCNO compliance status? 
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 8a.  
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to Question 9. 
Question 8a: To whom do you report compliance? 
Answer:  




Question 9: How are you notified of a PMO TCNO extension request and what is the 
process for validating this request? 
Answer:  
Question 10: Do you enforce PMO asset compliance if there is no valid extension? How? 
Answer:  
Question 11: Do you have the ability and authority to quarantine PMO machines that do not 
comply with TCNO policies? 
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 11a.  
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to Question 12. 
Question 11a: Do you have any PMO assets that are not exempt from automated TCNO 
patching?  Which ones? 
Answer:  
Question 12: Are there any other organizations you interface with to ensure TCNO 
compliance? (Please list) 
Answer:  
Question 13: Do you utilize any automated methods in your TCNO patching process?  If not, 
are there any procedure you would like to see automated (please explain)? 
Answer:  
Question 14: Do you audit/oversee individual PMO TCNO procedures such as testing, 
applicability assessment, installation, etc? 
Answer:  
Question 15: Are there any methods of TCNO process management (to include any processes 
used to ensure TCNO compliance) used within your PMO that you feel work 
particularly well? 
Answer:  
Question 16: Do you have any general comments or recommendations for improvement to 




Question 17:  May I receive an electronic copy of any TCNO written procedures your PMO 
maintains?  (If so, please attach it to your email response.)  If you do not 
maintain any written guidance, is there an individual I may speak with to better 











































BASE-LEVEL NCC CONTACTS RESPOSIBLE FOR GENERAL TCNO 
PROCEDURES 
SECTION 1: INTERVIEWEE INFO 
Question 1: Please provide your general job description (please do not include a specific 
duty title or position identifier): 
Please write your answer in this space Answer: 
Question 2: Please describe your role in your Base’s TCNO process.  
Answer:  
Question 3: How long have you been working with the Air Force TCNO process? 
(Years/Months):  
Answer:  
Question 4: How many assets are you personally responsible for ensuring TCNO 
compliance? 
Answer:  
Question 5: Are you familiar the Air Force TCNO-D (Dashboard) website? Do you utilize 
it? 
Answer:  
Question 6: Are you familiar with the Air Force regulation governing TCNO procedures? 
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 6a.  
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to Section 2: PMO Asset Info. 
Question 6a: To what capacity, if any does your PMO use the regulation in its TCNO 
processes? 
Answer:  
SECTION 2: PMO ASSET INFO 
Question 1: How many PMOs reside at your base? 
Answer:  
Question 2:  How many total PMO assets reside at your base? 
Answer:  
SECTION 3: ORGANIZATIONAL PROCEDURES 
Question 1: What guidance do you follow that dictates the TCNO process for your base 




Question 2: Is there an established method for identifying all PMO machines at your base? 
Answer:  
Question 3: Do you have the ability to scan/remotely monitor PMO machines for security 
vulnerabilities? 
Answer:  
Question 4: How and from whom do you receive notice that a TCNO is due for a PMO 
asset?   
Answer:  
Question 5: How do you communicate with FSAs responsible for PMO assets under your 
area of responsibility? 
Answer:  
Question 6: Does anyone at the base NCC level act as an FSA for any PMO assets? 
Answer:  
Question 7: How are you notified of PMO TCNO compliance? 
Answer:  
Question 8: Are you responsible for reporting PMO TCNO compliance status? 
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 8a.  
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to Question 9. 
Question 8a: To whom do you report PMO compliance? 
Answer:  
Question 8b: What procedures do you use and who dictates these procedures? 
Answer:  
Question 9: How are you notified of a PMO TCNO extension request and what is the 
process for validating this request? 
Answer:  




Question 11: Do you have the ability and authority to quarantine PMO machines that do not 
comply with TCNO policies? 
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 11a.  
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to Question 12. 
Question 11a: Do you have any PMO assets that are not exempt from automated TCNO 
patching?  Which ones? 
Answer:  
Question 12: Are there any other organizations you interface with to ensure PMO TCNO 
compliance? (Please list) 
Answer:  
Question 13: Do you utilize any automated methods in your PMO TCNO patching process?  
If not, are there any procedure you would like to see automated (please 
explain)? 
Answer:  
Question 14: Do you audit/oversee individual PMO TCNO procedures such as testing, 
applicability assessment, installation, etc? 
Answer:  
Question 15: Are there any methods of TCNO process management (to include any processes 
used to ensure TCNO compliance) used within your PMO that you feel work 
particularly well? 
Answer:  
Question 16: Do you have any general comments or recommendations for improvement to 
the overall TCNO patching/management process? 
Answer:  
Question 17:  May I receive an electronic copy of any TCNO written procedures your PMO 
maintains?  (If so, please attach it to your email response.)  If you do not 
maintain any written guidance, is there an individual I may speak with to better 









FSA Interview Outline 
SECTION 1: INTERVIEWEE INFO 
Question 1: Please provide your general job description (please do not include a specific 
duty title or position identifier): 
Please write your answer in this space Answer: 
Question 2: Please describe your role in the TCNO process.  
Answer:  
Question 3: How long have you been working with the Air Force TCNO process? 
(Years/Months):  
Answer:  
Question 4: How many assets are you personally responsible for ensuring TCNO 
compliance? 
Answer:  
Question 5: For how many different PMOs are you responsible for ensuring TCNO 
compliance? 
Answer:  
Question 6: Are you familiar the Air Force TCNO-D (Dashboard) website? Do you utilize 
it? 
Answer:  
Question 7: Are you familiar with the Air Force regulation governing TCNO procedures? 
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 7a.  
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to Section 2: Organizational/PMO Info. 
Question 7a: To what capacity, if any does your PMO use the regulation in its TCNO 
processes? 
Answer:  
SECTION 2: ORGANIZATIONAL/FSA PROCEDURES 
Question 1: Is there separate guidance you are required to follow for each PMO? 
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 1a.   
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to the Question 2. 





Question 1b: When were these policies/procedures created? 
Answer:  
Question 1c: When were these policies/procedures last updated? 
Answer:  
Question 1d: By whom are these policies/procedures maintained? 
Answer:  
Question 2: How (email, hard copy, website) and from whom do you receive notice of Air 
Force TCNOs?  
Answer:  
Question 3: Are you responsible for TCNO acknowledgment? 
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 3a.  
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to the Question 3d. 
Question 3a: Is this process dictated by established written guidance? If not, please describe 
the process in as much detail as possible. 
Answer:  
Question 3b: Is this process followed for every TCNO? 
Answer:  
Question 3c: What is the timeframe allocated to this process? 
Answer:  
Question 3d (only 
answer if you 
answered “No” 
to question 4):: 
Who is responsible for this process? Can you provide their contact information? 
Answer:  
Question 4: Do you determine TCNO applicability on your systems or is this done by 
another entity? (Applicability indicates whether the TCNO will be installed on 




**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 4a.  
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to the Question 5. 
Question 4a: Is this process dictated by established written guidance? If not, please describe 
the process in as much detail as possible. 
Answer:  
Question 4b: Is this process followed for every TCNO? 
Answer:  
Question 4c: What is the timeframe allocated to this process? 
Answer:  
Question 5: Do you perform TCNO testing on your systems or is this performed by another 
entity?   
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 5a.   
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to the Question 6. 
Question 5a: Is this process dictated by established written guidance? If not, please describe 
the process in as much detail as possible. 
Answer:  
Question 5b: Is this process followed for every TCNO? 
Answer:  
Question 5c: What is the timeframe allocated to this process? 
Answer:  
Question 5d: Is this process conducted in one location/facility? 
Answer:  
Question 6: Are you responsible for TCNO installation on your systems?  
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 6a.   
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to the Question 6d. 
Question 6a: Is this process dictated by established written guidance? If not, please describe 




Question 6b: Is this process followed for every TCNO? 
Answer:  
Question 6c: What is the timeframe allocated to this process? 
Answer:  
Question 6d (only 
answer if you 
answered “No” 
to question 6): 
Who is responsible for the installation process (ie. Another base level entity, 
another organization, etc.)?  May I have their contact information? 
Answer:  
Question 7: Are you responsible for reporting TCNO compliance?   
Answer:  
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 7a.   
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to the Question 7d. 
Question 7a: Is this process dictated by established written guidance? If not, please describe 
the process in as much detail as possible. 
Answer:  
Question 7b: Is this process followed for every TCNO?  If not, list any exceptions. 
Answer:  
Question 7c: What is the timeframe allocated to this process? 
Answer:  
Question 7d (only 
answer if you 
answered “No” 
to question 7): 
Who is responsible for the reporting process (ie. Another base level entity, 
another organization, etc.)?  May I have their contact information? 
Answer:  
Question 8: Do you maintain historical records of your TCNO compliance? 
Answer:  
Question 9: Is there an overall set timeline/deadline allocated to the TCNO process for your 
PMO? Is this timeline frequently met?  If not, how much would you say it is 
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exceeded on average? 
Answer:  
Question 9a: By whom and how is this timeline determined? 
Answer:  
Question 9b: Is this timeline frequently met?  If not, how much would you say it is exceeded 
on average? 
Answer:  
Question 10: What procedures do you follow if you require an extension for a given TCNO? 
Answer:  
Question 10a: Is this process dictated by established written guidance? If not, please describe 
the process in as much detail as possible. 
Answer:  
Question 11: How do you monitor compliance of your assets? 
Answer:  
Question 12: Are there any other organizations you interface with to ensure TCNO 
compliance? (Please list) 
Answer:  
Question 13: Do you utilize any automated methods in your TCNO patching process?  If not, 
are there any procedure you would like to see automated (please explain)? 
Answer:  
Question 14: Are there any methods of TCNO process management (to include any processes 
used to ensure TCNO compliance) used within your PMO that you feel work 
particularly well? 
Answer:  
Question 15: Do you have any general comments or recommendations for improvement to 
the overall TCNO patching/management process? 
Answer:  
Question 16:  May I receive an electronic copy of any TCNO written procedures your PMO 
maintains?  (If so, please attach it to your email response.)  If you do not 
maintain any written guidance, is there an individual I may speak with to better 





Interview Introduction (to be included with interviews that are conducted via email) 
 
Thank you for participating in this sponsored Air Force Institute of Technology research 
project. The goal of this research is to gain a better understanding of how Project 
Management Offices with assets operating on the Air Force Network perform the TCNO 
process and from this understanding, develop potential recommendations for standardized 
processes and identify any best practices.  If you have any questions about the questions 
themselves or any other aspect of the research, please don’t hesitate to contact me at 
michael.czumak@afit.edu .   
 
Please note: No identifying information obtained through this or subsequent interviews 
will be retained or reported in the final research report. In order to complete the research 
effort, data collected on individual subjects may include general duty description 
of/duration in current position, but no names (of interviewee or organization/PMO) or 
position identifiers will be retained. Data gathering will be focused on information 
specific to Air Force and PMO TCNO procedures.  
 
Directions: Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability.  There are 
answer spaces provided for each question as illustrated in the below example. Please feel 
free to add any space necessary to answer the questions.  Some questions have multiple 
parts.  Please answer the main question first, followed by any applicable sub-questions.  
Questions with multiple parts will have instructions guiding you along the way (denoted 
by a **): 
 
Example (note the directions provided under the answer space denoted by a **): 
 
Question 4: Are you familiar with the Air Force regulation governing TCNO procedures? 
Answer: Please write your answer in this space 
**If you answered “Yes” to the above question, continue to Question 4a.  
    If you answered “No”, please proceed to Section 2: Organizational/PMO Info. 
 
Since this research is focused on how TCNO processes are conducted in PMO 
organizations, the final question requests copies of any PMO TCNO guidance/policy.  If 
you are able to provide such guidance, please attach said guidance to your reply email.  If 
you are not able to provide such guidance, please describe the process in as much detail 
as possible when requested in the question.   
 
Again, thank you for participating in this research effort.  Your inputs are highly valued 
and appreciated.  
 
Very Respectfully, 
Lt Michael Czumak 
Student, Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) 
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Case Study Database Format 
 
The case study database is designed to organize the data collected during the course of 





- Case Study Database [File Folder]: The root folder of the file structure 
 
Literature Review [File Folder]: This folder will contain electronic    copies of all 
available documents listed in the bibliography of the final    case study.  
 
- Interviews [File Folder] 
 
- Collected Documents [File Folder] 
 
000X_Documents [File Folder]: All documents collected from 
interviewee 000X, where X corresponds to the numeric designator 
assigned to the interviewee for the basis of anonymity.  A separate 
folder will correspond to each interviewee.    
 
- Answered Questions [File Folder] 
 
Interview_Data_Collection_Sheet_IntX_000X.doc [Word 
Document]: This document house all of the information collected 
during the interview conducted with interviewee 000X, where X 
corresponds to the numeric designator assigned to the interviewee for 
the basis of anonymity.  A separate document will correspond to each 
interviewee.  In the event of multiple interviews with the same 
interviewee, a separate document will be generated for each interview 
X where IntX corresponds to the interview number. A template of this 

















Other Key Documents 
 
A basic Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet titled Interview_Info.xls will link to the above file 












PMO1 0001   Click here Click Here
PMO2  0002  Click here Click Here
0003 PMO2   Click here Click Here
PMO3 0004   Click here Click here
PMO3  0005  Click here Click here
0006 PMO4   Click here Click here
 
As can be seen above, for each interviewee, there is a link to the corresponding 
Interview_Data_Collection_Sheet_000X.doc under the Questions/Answers 
column.  In addition, there is a link to the corresponding Collected Documents 






The finalized case study database will be transferred to 2 CDs, one to be provided to the 




Interview Data Collection Sheet (Template)
 
Interviewee #: 0001 
Organization #: 0001 
Date: 





















Additional Documents to be sent by Interviewee 
 





Additional Information to be provided to Interviewee by Researcher  
 
















Ranked Totals Based On Historical Data—Lowest Performers 
This table is a list of all PMOs included in the final data analysis.  Each PMO was ranked in each category based on the analysis of the 
historical performance data as outlined in Chapter 4 (with 1 being the poorest and 46 being the best).  Each PMO’s ranks were totaled and 
the list was ordered based on these totals.  The top 25% in each category are highlighted.  The last three columns contain descriptive data 
about each PMO. 

































9 5 2 1 10 7 9 34 3 2 44 10 
16 1 1 2 24 3 15 46 1 1 46 11 
42 2 3 14 16 2 14 51 5 4 42 8 
12 19 6 12 5 14 1 57 15 9 32 3 
3 14 8 5 2 20 11 60 16 10 31 2 
15 7 9 21 9 9 5 60 17 11 30 1 
45 17 5 16 11 4 7 60 26 11 21 1 
40 4 4 6 20 11 19 64 7 3 40 9 
11 13 9 19 15 13 1 70 22 9 25 3 
37 16 7 19 18 5 6 71 24 9 23 3 
7 10 14 13 7 28 3 75 4 9 43 3 
39 23 12 11 8 22 4 80 21 7 26 5 
13 28 15 10 3 30 1 87 19 10 28 2 
33 20 12 19 26 10 1 88 36 11 11 1 
28 15 6 24 30 1 18 94 37 9 10 3 
21 6 14 8 29 29 12 98 6 11 41 1 
17 38 16 9 4 31 2 100 18 11 29 1 
19 12 9 15 13 17 34 100 9 5 38 7 
20 11 12 3 32 25 17 100 8 11 39 1 
4 18 14 26 6 15 25 104 29 11 18 1 
14 30 14 31 22 6 1 104 42 11 5 1 
26 21 13 29 43 1 1 108 44 11 3 1 
2 9 10 19 34 12 26 110 12 8 35 4 
23 24 13 7 27 27 16 114 30 11 17 1 
1 3 12 27 19 19 35 115 10 6 37 6 
18 39 16 4 21 31 8 119 2 10 45 2 
29 27 13 22 33 8 21 124 41 11 6 1 
24 25 14 18 23 23 22 125 27 10 20 2 
43 8 14 25 31 21 27 126 11 10 36 2 
6 36 16 32 12 31 1 128 40 11 7 1 
36 43 16 25 1 31 13 129 34 11 13 1 
32 22 11 17 28 18 35 131 23 10 24 2 
8 32 15 31 17 16 29 140 31 11 16 1 
38 44 16 27 14 31 10 142 25 11 22 1 
25 26 14 32 44 1 28 145 45 11 2 1 
30 29 15 30 36 4 35 149 39 11 8 1 
22 31 14 14 42 26 23 150 28 11 19 1 
27 40 16 28 41 31 1 157 43 11 4 1 
41 45 16 32 35 31 1 160 13 10 34 2 
31 33 15 32 46 4 35 165 46 11 1 1 
35 42 16 25 37 31 20 171 32 11 15 1 
44 34 15 23 45 24 30 171 38 11 9 1 
10 37 16 31 25 31 33 173 35 11 12 1 
46 46 16 20 40 31 24 177 14 10 33 2 
34 41 16 25 38 31 31 182 20 9 27 3 




Ranked Totals Based On Historical Data—Highest Performers 
This table is a list of all PMOs included in the final data analysis.  Each PMO was ranked in each category based on the analysis of the 
historical performance data as outlined in Chapter 4 (with 1 being the best and 46 being the poorest).  Each PMO’s ranks were totaled and 
the list was ordered based on these totals.  The top 25% in each category are highlighted.  The last three columns contain descriptive data 
about each PMO. 


































5 1 1 2 8 1 4 17 33 10 14 2 
34 1 1 7 9 1 5 24 20 9 27 3 
44 2 2 9 2 8 6 29 38 11 9 1 
10 1 1 2 22 1 3 30 35 11 12 1 
46 1 1 11 7 1 12 33 14 10 33 2 
31 2 2 1 1 28 1 35 46 11 1 1 
35 1 1 7 10 1 16 36 32 11 15 1 
22 3 3 17 5 6 13 47 28 11 19 1 
27 1 1 4 6 1 35 48 43 11 4 1 
30 4 2 3 11 29 1 50 39 11 8 1 
41 1 1 1 12 1 35 51 13 10 34 2 
25 5 3 1 3 33 8 53 45 11 2 1 
8 2 2 2 30 16 7 59 31 11 16 1 
32 7 6 14 19 14 1 61 23 10 24 2 
43 20 3 7 16 11 9 66 11 10 36 2 
38 1 1 5 33 1 26 67 25 11 22 1 
24 5 3 13 24 9 14 68 27 10 20 2 
29 5 4 9 14 24 15 71 41 11 6 1 
6 1 1 1 35 1 35 74 40 11 7 1 
1 25 5 5 28 13 1 77 10 6 37 6 
23 6 4 23 20 5 20 78 30 11 17 1 
36 1 1 7 46 1 23 79 34 11 13 1 
2 19 7 12 13 20 10 81 12 8 35 4 
18 1 1 26 26 1 28 83 2 10 45 2 
26 7 4 3 4 34 35 87 44 11 3 1 
4 10 3 6 41 17 11 88 29 11 18 1 
20 17 5 27 15 7 19 90 8 11 39 1 
19 16 8 16 34 15 2 91 9 5 38 7 
21 22 3 23 18 3 24 93 6 11 41 1 
14 3 3 2 25 26 35 94 42 11 5 1 
17 1 1 22 43 1 34 102 18 11 29 1 
28 13 11 8 17 35 18 102 37 9 10 3 
33 8 5 12 21 22 35 103 36 11 11 1 
13 4 2 21 44 2 35 108 19 10 28 2 
39 7 5 20 39 10 32 113 21 7 26 5 
7 18 3 18 40 4 33 116 4 9 43 3 
37 12 10 12 29 27 30 120 24 9 23 3 
11 15 8 12 32 19 35 121 22 9 25 3 
40 24 14 24 27 21 17 127 7 3 40 9 
3 14 9 25 45 12 25 130 16 10 31 2 
15 21 8 10 38 23 31 131 17 11 30 1 
45 11 13 15 36 30 29 134 26 11 21 1 
12 9 12 19 42 18 35 135 15 9 32 3 
42 26 15 17 31 32 22 143 5 4 42 8 
16 27 17 28 23 31 21 147 1 1 46 11 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































SQL Queries used to mine data from database 
 
PMOs with more than 1 affected asset 
SELECT DISTINCT (pmo.atppmo) 
FROM actions, pmo 
WHERE actions.actiontype="TCNO" And pmo.atpactionID=actions.actionid And pmo.atpaffected>0 
ORDER BY pmo.ATPPMO; 
 
Number of Different TCNOs 
SELECT count(*) 
FROM [SELECT DISTINCT (actions.shortname) 
FROM actions, pmo 
WHERE actions.ActionType="TCNO" And pmo.ATPActionID=actions.actionid And 
pmo.ATPAffected>0 And (pmo.ATPPMO=forms!form1.List_PMO_Names.value) 
ORDER BY actions.ShortName]. AS [%$##@_Alias]; 
 
Number of Non-Compliant Patches 
SELECT sum(pmo.atpaffected-pmo.atppatched) AS Expr1 
FROM pmo, actions 
WHERE actions.ActionType="TCNO" And pmo.ATPActionID=actions.actionid And 
pmo.ATPAffected>0 And (pmo.atppatched<pmo.atpaffected) And (pmo.atpaffected-pmo.atppatched)>0 
And (pmo.ATPPMO=forms!form1.List_PMO_Names.value); 
 
Number Non-Compliant TCNOs 
SELECT count(pmo.atpunitid) AS Expr1 
FROM actions, pmo 
WHERE (((actions.ActionType)="TCNO") And ((pmo.ATPActionID)=actions.actionid) And 
((pmo.ATPAffected)>0) And ((pmo.ATPPMO)=forms!form1.List_PMO_Names.value)) And 
pmo.atppatched<pmo.atpaffected; 
 
Number of Units 
SELECT count(*) 
FROM [select  Distinct(pmo.atpunitid) 
FROM actions, pmo 
WHERE actions.ActionType="TCNO" And pmo.ATPActionID=actions.actionid And 
pmo.ATPAffected>0 And pmo.ATPPMO=forms!form1.List_PMO_Names.value]. AS [%$##@_Alias]; 
 
Total Days Non-Compliant 
SELECT sum(pmo.atpdate-actions.suspensedate) AS Expr1 
FROM pmo, actions 
WHERE actions.ActionType="TCNO" And pmo.ATPActionID=actions.actionid And 
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